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Preface 
In 1992 CPB published the study Scanning the Future. It offered four long-term scenarios for 
the world economy, based on an assessment of current trends, strengths and weaknesses. A 
number of follow-up studies used these scenarios as a tool for analysis of particular policies 
with long-term implications. The new study Four Futures of Europe develops four new 
scenarios. Again, the aim is to use them as a tool for analysis in subsequent studies. Moreover, 
this study elaborates on policy challenges that the European Union and the member states 
themselves will face during the coming decades in light of a number of social and international 
trends.  
While Four Futures of Europe analyses in great detail the fundamental key-uncertainties of 
the scenarios, this accompanying study concentrates on a quantitative underpinning of the 
scenarios. The scenarios are quantified using WorldScan: a computable general-equilibrium 
model for the word economy developed at CPB.  
The study was carried out by Arjan Lejour. A number of other CPB economists have 
provided useful contributions to and comments on the simulations and the texts, including Henri 
de Groot, Fré Huizinga, Ton Manders, Ruud de Mooij, Hans Roodenburg, Bert Smid, and Paul 
Tang. We thank Nico van Leeuwen and Gerard Verweij for their research assistance. From 
RIVM, Johannes Bollen, Petra van Egmond, Sonja Kruitwagen, Bert de Vries, and Detlef van 
Vuuren provided useful contributions. Moreover, we thank the participants of the seminars at 




Director, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis   6 
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Summary 
This study presents four economic scenarios for Europe until 2040. The scenarios are developed 
around two key uncertainties: international cooperation and institutional reforms. In the 
scenarios Strong Europe (SE) and Global Economy (GE), international cooperation is 
prominent, while the other scenarios, Regional Communities (RC) and Transatlantic Market 
(TM), feature limited international cooperation. Public institutions are important in Strong 
Europe and Regional Communities. In Global Economy and Transatlantic Market the role of 
the public sector is limited. There is more room for private initiatives in these scenarios.  
To illustrate the scenarios, this document presents quantitative developments described with 
an applied general equilibrium model developed at CPB: WorldScan. By using this model we 
are able to derive consistency between developments in the scenarios and to apply common 
economic mechanisms. The variation in the outcomes for the scenarios is derived by 
introducing differences in exogenous trends. This document explains and motivates these 
differences.  
More regulation and income redistribution in Regional Communities and Strong Europe is 
accompanied by higher unemployment rates and lower participation, as compared to the 
scenarios in which private initiatives are given more leeway (i.e. Global Economy and 
Transatlantic Market). Combined with the ageing of the population, this result implies that 
employment contracts in Regional Communities, while it grows only moderately in Strong 
Europe, due to immigration. More incentives for labour supply imply a higher participation rate 
in Transatlantic Market than in Strong Europe. However, lower population growth in the former 
scenario has the effect that overall employment growth is equivalent in Strong Europe and 
Transatlantic Market.  
The emphasis on an efficient functioning of markets in Global Economy and Transatlantic 
Market is accompanied by a higher labour productivity than in Strong Europe and Regional 
Communities. Labour productivity growth is weakest in Regional Communities. This weak 
growth, together with a fall in employment, causes GDP per capita in Regional Communities to 
grow by only 0.6% per year.  
Trade liberalisation and economic integration boost trade and growth in Global Economy 
and Strong Europe. High growth in Asia redirects European trade flows towards that continent, 
so that the share of intra-EU trade decreases. In Transatlantic Market, the EU cooperates more 
closely with the United States and Latin America, which boosts EU-US trade. In Regional 
Communities, growth in world exports is negligible, and the share of intra-EU trade remains 
relatively high. 
In Strong Europe and Global Economy, governments stimulate national savings by curbing 
budgets deficits and stimulating private savings. Although this does not prevent a decline in   8 
saving rates because of ageing, it is less dramatic than in Transatlantic Market and Regional 
Communities, where saving rates decrease by 6%-points between 2000 and 2040. As the 
demand for capital also falls substantially, real interest rates still decrease in Regional 
Communities and, to a lesser extent, in Strong Europe. In Global Economy and Transatlantic 
Market, increasing investment demand causes a higher real interest rate. 
   9 
1  Introduction 
This study presents a quantitative underpinning of four scenarios for Europe. Scenarios are 
feasible and consistent views of the future. They do not aim to predict the future, but rather to 
sketch alternative futures. These future states of the world then form the background against 
which strategic decisions can be explored. 
Governments, non-governmental organisations and companies have to take strategic 
decisions under uncertainty. The uncertainty refers to the environment in which decision 
makers operate. Indeed, the world can change rapidly due to natural events, political changes, 
social developments, and technological trends. By considering alternative futures, one can 
better prepare for unforeseen circumstances and perhaps take early action to deal with a 
particular conjuncture.  
The four new scenarios are extensively motivated and discussed in De Mooij and Tang 
(2003). Here, the focus is on the quantification of the scenarios. The scenarios are quantified, 
using a computable general-equilibrium (CGE) model for the world economy, WorldScan. The 
quantitative underpinning has several purposes. The first is that the CGE model ensures that the 
scenarios are consistent in several respects, since economic variables conform to identities, 
constraints and the current knowledge about interactions in the economy. Second, the 
quantification gives a feel for the relative importance of various developments for the future 
well being of society.  
WorldScan is well suited for scenario analysis because it is a dynamic model. Originally 
built for CPB’s long-run study “Scanning the Future” (CPB, 1992), WorldScan was used later 
for other scenario studies on globalisation and climate change.
1 WorldScan is able to reproduce 
not only scenario-specific assumptions on demography and technology, but also globalisation 
tendencies and energy developments. The model’s general equilibrium character enables it to 
analyse the effects of scenario assumptions on goods, services, capital and labour markets.  
The main characteristics of the scenarios are presented in De Mooij and Tang (2003), which 
does not present much detail, concentrating instead on the main variables for Europe. This 
document presents not only more detailed results for Europe, but also the results for other 
regions. This is useful because the results of this study will also be used for other scenarios 
studies, particularly for the CPB study for the Netherlands, and the RIVM study on 
sustainability.  
Another important element of this document is the motivation of the quantitative results. 
CPB’s CGE model WorldScan is discussed, together with the assumptions made for the various 
scenarios. We motivate the translation of the qualitative scenarios in De Mooij and Tang (2003) 
to the exogenous inputs in the CGE model, and discuss the varying assumptions underpinning 
the scenarios and their relation to the quantitative outcomes.  
 
1 Examples are our collaborative study with the OECD on globalisation (OECD, 1997), active involvement in the climate-
change studies of the IPCC (2000), and Lejour (2003).    10 
The document is set up as follows. The scenarios are summarised in chapter 2, which also 
presents some of the main scenario characteristics. Chapter 3 explains the main mechanisms of 
the model and some of the main inputs into the model. Chapters 4 to 7 present the scenario-
specific assumptions and outcomes of the model. Chapter 4 focuses on population and labour 
supply developments. These are exogenous inputs in the model. Chapter 5 relates these 
developments to the outcomes on GDP and sectoral production in the model. Chapter 6 explains 
the working of the international capital market and the outcomes on interest rates in the various 
scenarios. Chapter 7 focuses on trade. The assumptions on the degree of globalisation and 
regionalisation are translated into the level of trade barriers and the size of trade. The direction 
and composition of trade are also covered. Chapter 8 concludes.   11 
2  The scenarios
2 
This chapter presents the four scenarios (Strong Europe, Regional Communities, Global 
Economy and Transatlantic Market) and explains how they are constructed around two key 
uncertainties: international cooperation and institutional reforms in the public sector. The last 
section illustrates the scenarios with the simulation outcomes. 
  
2.1  The scenarios introduced 
Key uncertainties 
The scenarios are developed around two key uncertainties, which are defined on a meta level, 
from which one can derive a general characterisation of the scenarios. In this study, the two key 
uncertainties refer to the policy responses to the challenges that Europe will face during the 
coming decades.
3 The first challenge is whether countries will succeed in international 
cooperation, which is necessary in order to deal adequately with cross-border issues. In 
particular, this uncertainty springs from the difficulties in reforming current international 
organisations such as the European Union and the WTO, and institutionalising new forms of 
cooperation to deal with global problems. International cooperation thus refers to cooperation 
both in the European Union and between the European Union and other regions. The second 
key uncertainty refers to institutional reforms in the public sector in European economies. It 
involves developments that put the public sector under pressure such as ageing, the divide 
between low-skilled and high-skilled labour, policy competition, and individualisation. National 
governments are clearly unable to continue on the old footing. It is uncertain, however, how 
they will respond to these challenges. 
These two key uncertainties are illustrated in figure 2.1. Here, the horizontal axis represents 
outcomes with regard to the response of the public sector in Europe to various challenges. It 
runs from a focus on public responsibilities, at the left, to a focus on private responsibilities, at 
the right. The vertical axis, representing the outcomes with respect to international cooperation, 
moves from a focus on national issues, at the bottom, to broad international cooperation, at the 
top. Figure 2.1 thus yields four combinations in the two key uncertainties. The four quadrants 
each describe a perspective on the world. The upper left quadrant represents a world labelled 
Strong Europe    (SE), featuring ample international cooperation and important public institutions. 
The bottom left reflects the scenario Regional Communities (RC), combining ample public 
responsibilities with little international cooperation. The lower right quadrant represents 
 
2 The scenarios are extensively described in De Mooij and Tang (2003). This chapter is a summary of their chapter 15. 
3 In this study, our starting point is the scenarios developed in De Mooij and Tang (2003). Their publication describes the 
construction of the scenarios and provides an extensive motivation of the key uncertainties.   12 
Transatlantic Market (TM), a world with affinity for national sovereignty and ample room for 
private initiatives. Finally, Global Economy is given in the upper right quadrant, combining 
flourishing international cooperation and a move towards more private responsibilities. 







Strong Europe Global Economy
Regional Communities Transatlantic Market
 
Strong Europe 
European countries maintain social cohesion through public institutions. As a result, society 
accepts that the more equitable distribution of welfare limits the possibilities to improve 
economic efficiency. Yet, governments respond to the growing pressure on the public sector by 
undertaking selective reforms in the labour market, in social security, and in public production. 
Combined with early measures to accommodate the effects of ageing, these policies help to 
maintain a stable and growing economy. In the European Union, member states learn from each 
other’s experience, which creates a process of convergence of institutions within Europe. 
Reform of the process of EU decision-making lays the foundation for a successful, strong 
European Union. The enlargement is a success, and integration advances— geographically, 
economically and politically. European leadership is important for achieving broad international 
cooperation, not only in the area of trade but also in other areas like climate change. 
 
Regional Communities 
European countries rely on collective arrangements to maintain an equal distribution of welfare. 
At the same time, governments are unsuccessful at modernising welfare-state arrangements. A 
strong lobby of vested interests blocks reforms in various areas. Together with an expanding 
public sector, this situation puts a severe strain on European economies.   13 
The European Union cannot adequately cope with the Eastern enlargement and fails to reform 
its institutions. As an alternative, a core of rich European countries emerges. Cooperation in this 
sub-group of relatively homogeneous member states gains a more permanent character. The 
world is fragmented into a number of trade blocks, and multilateral cooperation is modest.  
Global Economy 
European countries find a new balance between private and public responsibilities. Increasing 
preferences of people for flexibility and diversity, and growing pressure on public sectors, give 
rise to reforms. New institutions are based on private initiatives and market-based solutions. 
European governments concentrate on their core tasks, such as the provision of pure public 
goods and the protection of property rights. They engage less in income redistribution and 
public insurance, so that income inequality grows. 
International developments also reflect increasing preferences for diversity and efficiency. 
Political integration is not feasible, as governments assign a high value to their national 
sovereignty in many areas. Moreover, policy competition becomes standard in many policy 
areas. Economic integration, however, becomes broader (not always deeper), as countries find it 
in their mutual interest to remove barriers to trade, investment and migration. With a limited 
amount of competences and a focus on the functioning of the internal market, the European 
Union finds it relatively easy to enlarge further eastwards. Similarly, negotiations in the WTO 
are successfully completed. Regional and global integration puts poor countries on a path of 
catching-up and high growth. As international cooperation in non-trade issues fails, the problem 
of climate change intensifies, while European taxes on capital income gradually decline under 
tax competition. 
Transatlantic Market 
European countries limit the role of the state and rely more on market exchange. This boosts 
technology-driven growth and increases inequality. The inheritance of a large public sector in 
EU countries is not easily dissolved. New markets—e.g. for education and social insurances— 
lack transparency and competition, which brings about new social and economic problems. The 
interests of the elderly dominate policy decisions, which makes it difficult to dismantle the pay-
as-you-go pension systems in continental Europe. Government failures thus compound to 
market failures. 
EU member states focus primarily on national interests. EU decision-making is not 
reformed, which complicates further integration in the European Union. The EU redirects its 
attention to the United States, and agrees upon transatlantic economic integration. This 
intensifies trade in services, which yields welfare gains on both sides of the Atlantic. The 
prosperity of the club of rich countries is in sharp contrast with the poverty in Eastern Europe 
and in developing countries. 
   14 
2.2  The scenarios illustrated 
Table 2.1 compares the numerical characteristics of the four scenarios. It reveals the 
implications of the relative focus on equity concerns in Regional Communities and Strong 
Europe via a bigger role of the state. More regulations and income redistribution are 
accompanied by higher unemployment rates and lower participation, compared to the scenarios 
in which private initiatives are given more leeway (i.e. Global Economy and Transatlantic 
Market). Combined with ageing, this implies that employment contracts in Regional 
Communities, and grows only moderately in Strong Europe (due to immigration). In 
Transatlantic Market, the participation rate is higher than in Strong Europe, due to more 
incentives for labour supply among the young. However, overall employment growth is 
equivalent in Strong Europe and Transatlantic Market, since there is less immigration in the 
latter scenario.  
The emphasis on an efficient functioning of markets in Global Economy and Transatlantic 
Market is accompanied by a higher labour productivity than in Strong Europe and Regional 
Communities. In Global Economy and Transatlantic Market, productivity grows by 2.1% and 
1.8% per year, respectively. In Regional Communities, labour productivity growth is weakest, 
with a growth rate of 1.1%. Together with a fall in employment, GDP per capita in Regional 
Communities grows only by 0.8% per year.  
 
Table 2.1  Characterisation of the EU-15 in the four scenarios 
  Past                  2000-2040 










           
GDP  2.2  1.6  1.9  0.6  2.5 
Labour productivity  1.5  1.5  1.8  1.1  2.1 
Employment  0.7  0.1  0.1  -0.5  0.4 
Population  0.3  0.3  0.0  -0.2  0.3 
World exports  5.6  4.5  3.7  2.4  5.6 
     
  Past                  2040 








           
Participation rate  46.6  41.6  45.2  40.2  45.8 
Unemployment  8.5  5.8  3.9  8.3  3.9 
Savings rate  18.8  15.1  13.0  12.7  15.6 
Interest rate  3.6  3.3  4.3  2.6  3.8 
Share intra EU-15 trade  53.5  47.3  49.3  52.8  39.4 
GDP per capita (index)  100.0  162.9  210.4  134.6  234.5 
 
Source: World Bank (2001) for historical numbers, and WorldScan for simulation results from 2000 onwards. The EU-15 represents the 
current 15 EU members 
   15 
Trade liberalisation and economic integration boost trade and growth in Global Economy and 
Strong Europe. World exports increase in these scenarios by 5.6% and 4.5%, respectively. 
Because of high growth in Asia, European trade flows redirect towards that continent so that the 
share of intra-EU trade decreases, except in Regional Communities. In Transatlantic Market, 
the EU cooperates more closely with the United States and Latin America, which boosts EU-US 
trade. In Regional Communities, growth in world exports is low, and the share of intra-EU trade 
remains relatively high.
4 
In Strong Europe and Global Economy, governments boost national savings by curbing budgets 
deficits and stimulating private savings. Although this does not prevent a decline in saving rates 
due to ageing, this drop in savings is less dramatic than in Transatlantic Market and Regional 
Communities, where saving rates decrease by 6%-points between 2000 and 2040. As the 
demand for capital also falls substantially, real interest rates still decrease in Regional 
Communities and, to a lesser extent, in Strong Europe. In Global Economy and Transatlantic 
Market, increasing investment demand raises the real interest rate. 
 
 The rest of this document explains the results in table 2.1. First we present the model, and 
thereby the economic mechanism applied in the scenarios. Second, the exogenous variables and 
their sources are discussed. Finally, we present the outcomes of the model, not only for Europe 
but also for the other regions. 
 
4 Note that in all scenarios the growth of world trade is lower than in the past, due to the ageing of the populations in OECD 
countries, and lower population growth in developing countries. This depresses growth. Moreover, the shift from agricultural 
and industrial economies towards services economies, especially in Asia, tends to moderate the growth in trade volumes 
because services are less tradable than commodities. 
   16   17 
 
3  WorldScan 
This chapter presents the characteristics of the simulation model and of the exogenous variables. Section 
3.1 explains the model in an intuitive way, highlighting the main mechanisms of the model in order to give 
the reader a tool in understanding the simulation results. The second section presents the common 
elements in the scenarios. The last section briefly reviews the scenario-specific inputs in the model. These 
differences, together with the mechanisms of the model, drive the simulation outcomes of the scenarios. 
3.1  The model 
WorldScan 
We quantify the scenarios by using our dynamic model WorldScan. WorldScan is an applied 
general equilibrium model for the world economy. The model was developed in the nineties for 
CPB’s previous scenario study Scanning the Future. The model has thereafter often been used 
for scenario studies, analyses of climate-change policies and trade policies. WorldScan is well 
suited to reproduce scenario developments on demography, technology, energy and 
globalisation. A few years ago the model was documented (CPB, 1999). The current version of 
the model has been substantially revised, and will be described in the near future.
5 Below we 
describe the main mechanisms of the model. 
General Equilibrium 
General equilibrium models describe the supply and demand relations of markets. In these 
models, prices of goods and factor inputs are flexible, such that demand and supply become 
equal at a given price. These models describe also the interactions between several markets. For 
example, firms must determine the factor inputs necessary to produce a final good, given the 
price and supply of that good. The supply, which is determined by the equilibrium price, 
determines the necessary inputs and therefore the demand at the input markets. Assume that 
consumers prefer more of these final goods. Then, the price of the goods will increase. Firms 
want to produce more and will demand more inputs. As a result, the prices for the input factors 
will increase because of the increase in demand of the final good. We call these mechanisms 
general equilibrium effects.  
Producers 
This version of WorldScan distinguishes 16 goods and services markets, a labour market, and a 
capital market. There are 16 types of producers, each of which produces one type of good. We 
call this a sector. All goods are produced by using labour, capital and intermediate inputs, albeit 
 
5 Verweij (2002) gives a preliminary description of the new characteristics of WorldScan.   18 
in different proportions. The relative demand for each of these inputs depends on the 
characteristics of the sectoral production function. In general, we assume that labour and capital 
are fairly good substitutes. Moreover, although we consider intermediate inputs to also be good 
substitutes, there are hardly any substitution possibilities between the intermediate inputs, on 
the one hand, and capital and labour, on the other hand. 
6 
Consumers 
Besides producers we have consumers. Consumers demand the sixteen different consumption 
goods and services, and provide labour and capital to the firms. We assume that the supply of 
labour is exogenous. Because consumers save a part of their income, they are able to deliver the 
firms capital in return for income. Savings depend on income growth and demographic 
characteristics. In the OECD countries, the latter variables represent ageing within the 
population, which harms savings. 
Labour markets 
In the section above we described the supply and demand relations. Consumers supply labour, 
and firms demand it. We assume that there is a national labour market in which the price of 
labour (the wage rate) is flexible. In the end, supply and demand are equal at the market-
clearing wage. We have modelled unemployment exogenously. A part of the labour supply is 
unemployed: that share is scenario specific. The supply of labour minus the unemployment 
level will be equal to labour demand in equilibrium.  
Capital markets 
Consumers supply capital, and firms ask for it. The equilibrium between demand and supply 
determines the price of capital.
7 In contrast to the labour market, the regional capital markets 
are assumed to be linked to each other. So if capital is abundant in one region (and thus is 
relatively inexpensive), it is invested in another region in which capital is scarce (capital is 
expensive). However, there are some barriers in investing abroad. Therefore, interregional 
capital mobility reduces, but does not eliminate, the capital price differentials between regions. 
In the latter case we would have one global capital market.  
Capital can be used in production only if producers buy investment goods. An investment 
good consists of several goods from various sectors, such as capital goods, services, and 
buildings (construction). The producers supply these goods. The total demand for goods and 
services is determined by consumers, and by producers who demand intermediate and 
investment goods.  
 
6 The appendix provides more details on the production structure.  
7 Note that the price of capital is a function of the investment price times the sum of the real interest rate and depreciation 
rate.   19 
Goods markets and trade 
As for capital, the regional goods markets are linked to each other. Not only the home market, 
but also foreign markets determine the demand for a good. We assume that each region 
produces a different variety of that good. Because we distinguish 16 regions, there are 16 
varieties for each of the 16 sectors. In principle, consumers demand all the varieties. The 
demand for each of the varieties depends on its relative price, the substitution possibilities 
between the varieties, transportation costs, trade barriers and preferences for the variety. If the 
price of a particular variety goes up, demand will decrease in favour of other varieties. Total 
demand for each variety depends thus on the demand at the home and foreign markets. Bilateral 
trade depends on consumer preferences for regional varieties of a good and differences in 
relative prices. The latter depend, for example, on trade barriers, which are described later on in 
this chapter. 
GDP growth 
So far, we have viewed the model only from a static perspective, and have neglected the 
dynamics—particularly economic growth. As economic growth is a prominent issue in 
scenarios with a forty-year time span, we must return to production. The value added of 
production is generated by using technology, capital and labour. Value added grows because of 
technological progress, employment growth or capital growth. To put it differently, valued 
added grows by the increase in labour productivity and labour. Labour productivity is 
determined by technological progress and capital growth per unit of labour. We control the 
valued-added growth in the scenarios because labour productivity and labour are, to some 
extent, exogenous variables. Employment growth is exogenous, and is derived from population 
growth, its composition, the age-specific participation rates, and the unemployment rate. In each 
of the scenarios we made specific assumptions on these variables. Labour productivity growth 
can be steered by the assumptions on technological progress. There is no one-to-one relation 
between technology and labour productivity, because the latter variable is also determined by 
capital growth per unit of labour, which is endogenous. To a large extent, however, 
technological progress determines labour productivity. The scenario-specific assumptions on 
technological progress and employment determine economic growth in the scenarios.  
The government 
Most CGE models do not model the government in much detail. This goes back to the national 
accounts and input-output tables that are normally used for data. These data do not report 
government transfers and social security. The government collects taxes on imports and 
consumption. It spends tax income on (export) subsidies and consumption. This is also the case 
in WorldScan. Government transfers and social security are not modelled. This implies that the 
model is better suited to explore the uncertainties involved with international cooperation 
quantitatively than with public and private responsibilities. The latter key uncertainty affects the   20 
outcomes of the model only through exogenous changes in the unemployment rate and 
participation rates.  
Regions and sectors 
We distinguish 16 regions and 16 sectors. The EU-15 is divided into eight regions: Germany, 
France, UK, Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, Italy, Spain and Rest EU (comprising of 
Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Portugal and Greece). 
Moreover, we distinguish Central Europe, Former Soviet Union, Turkey, US, Rest OECD, 
Latin America, Middle East and North Africa and rest of the world (mainly Asia and Africa). 
For each region, we distinguish 16 sectors. These consist of agriculture, energy (primary energy 
and electricity), other raw materials, six manufacturing sectors and seven service sectors. The 
appendix provides more information on the country and sectoral details and the key parameter 
values. 
 
3.2  Common characteristics in the scenarios 
The quantitative outcomes of the various scenarios are steered by the variation in exogenous 
inputs. However, some exogenous variables are similar in all scenarios. We have two reasons to 
do this. The first is that some trends are common in all scenarios, such as trade liberalisation 
between the EU-15 and the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). The second is that 
the model is calibrated on one database, which is scenario independent. Many elasticities and 
exogenous variables, such as trade barriers, are determined in the calibration procedure and are 
therefore identical in all scenarios. 
 
This section first discusses these common characteristics. We present the common trends on 
sectoral total factor productivity (TFP) growth, sectoral consumption patterns, and trade policy 
(see table 3.1). The subsequent section discusses the variation in exogenous inputs between the 
scenarios.  
 
Table 3.1  Common trends in the scenarios 
Variable  Source  Reference 
     
Relative sectoral TFP growth   based on historical trends ISDB data (OECD)  see Kets and Lejour (2003) 
Sectoral consumption  based on GTAP data  see Verweij (2003) 
Europe agreements  elimination tariffs manufacturing EU-15- CEEC  see Lejour et al. (2001) 
EU enlargement (partial)  elimination all remaining tariffs EU-15- CEEC  see Lejour et al. (2004) 
   21 
Our calibration year is 1997. The model is calibrated on the basis of the GTAP database, 
version 5 (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002). Using data of the World Bank (2001), we first 
simulated the model from 1997 to 2000 to reproduce GDP per capita and unemployment rates 
in 2000. 
Sectoral total factor productivity growth 
TFP growth depends on the scenario characteristics, but we introduce common trends for the 
relative sectoral TFP growth. Based on the ISDB data set from the OECD, Kets and Lejour 
(2003) calculated the relative sectoral TFP growth between 1970 and 1991 (see table 3.2). The 
numbers are an average of all OECD countries for which data were available. Unfortunately, 
they were not able to pick sectoral TFP developments in the nineties because of lack of data. 
This implies that rapid TFP developments in communication and some other services are not 
included in these data, although TFP in communication was already growing rapidly in the 
seventies and eighties. We increase relative sectoral TFP growth in the Transatlantic Market 
scenario for the sectors communication, capital goods and services, because that scenario is 
characterised by rapid ICT developments. 
Table 3.2  Sectoral TFP growth relative to the mean 
Sector  Growth     Sector  Growth 
       
Agriculture  3.1     Capital goods  2.4 
Energy
a  1.0     Transport  1.6 
Other raw materials
a  1.0     Communication  3.9 
Food processing  1.2     Construction
b  0.3 
Other consumption goods  1.8     Trade services  0.8 
Paper and publishing  1.1     Financial services
b  0.3 
Chemicals and minerals  3.4     Other business services
b  0.3 
Metals  2.3     Other services  0.3 
 
Source: Kets and Lejour (2003). Note that numbers larger (smaller) than 1 imply that sectoral TFP grows faster (slower) than average 
(macro) TFP. 
a Relative TFP growth is imposed due to missing data. 
b Relative TFP growth is set equal to that in other services, because underlying data delivered (implausible) negative growth 
 
These numbers show that TFP growth is relatively high in telecommunications, agriculture, 
capital goods, chemicals and metals. It is very low or negligible in most service sectors, except 
transport and communications. 
Consumption   
Thus far, we have said that consumers demand final goods from different sectors. How do they 
choose among these goods? We know that consumption patterns differ across countries and 
depend on per capita income and relative prices. We represent this by using a linear expenditure   22 
system to allocate total consumption over the various consumption sectors.
8 The allocation 
pattern depends on subsistence levels that ‘guarantee’ minimal spending on each of the 
categories, and income and price elasticities. Table 3.3, which presents the income elasticities in 
the beginning of the simulation period, shows that if income per capita increases, then 
consumers spend relatively less on beverages and tobacco, food and clothing and footwear. 
They spend relatively more on education and medical care, household furniture, recreation, 
transport and communication and other goods and services. In time, the minimal spending 
levels become a smaller fraction of total spending. The income elasticities for sectoral 
consumption converge eventually to 1. This is delayed in the scenarios by increasing the 
minimal spending levels by a fraction of the GDP per capita increase. 
Given that consumers have decided on their budget shares to spend on a particular type of 
good, they must then decide on which particular varieties of that good they will spend their 
money. 
 
Table 3.3  Income elasticities for sectoral consumption 
Sector    Income elasticity     Sector  Income elasticity 
       
Beverages and tobacco  0.9     Household furniture  1.1 
Clothing and footwear  0.9     Other goods and services  1.3 
Education and medical care  1.2     Recreation  1.3 
Food  0.4     Transport and communication  1.3 
Gross rent and fuel  1.0     
       
Source: Verweij (2003). 
 
Trade barriers 
Besides the trends on sectoral TFP growth and sectoral consumption, economic events with 
respect to the EU enlargement have been incorporated in all scenarios.
9 We included the Europe 
agreements, which imply that import tariffs in manufacturing between the current EU members 
and the candidates had to be eliminated in 2000. Moreover, we assume that the enlargement is 
to some extent an irreversible event. We eliminate all import and export tariffs in the other 
sectors (agriculture, food processing and energy) between 2001 and 2004. We also introduce 
common external import tariffs for the EU-15 and candidate countries (so the countries form a 
customs union). However, the completion of the internal market and free migration is scenario 
dependent.  
 
8 The consumption sector structure is different from the production sector structure because empirical research on sectoral 
consumption often uses other consumption categories than the production sectors in our database. It is relatively easy to 
transform production sectors to consumption sectors and vice versa (see Verweij, 2003). 
9 Lejour et al. (2004) describe this in more detail.   23 
We introduce various forms of trade liberalisation on a regional and global scale in the 
scenarios. To give some idea of the possible effects, we present at an aggregated level some of 
the import and export tariffs in the model based on the GTAP data. 
   
Table 3.4  Import tariffs in the OECD and non-OECD countries in 1997 
Exporting region                              Importing region 
       
Agriculture/food  OECD  Non-OECD  World 
       
OECD  33.9  30.6  32.2 
Non-OECD  24.1  32.3  25.7 
       
Manufacturing  OECD  Non-OECD  World 
       
OECD  2.7  9.2  5.5 
Non-OECD  4.9  12.1  5.8 
 
Source: GTAP database (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002). Within the OECD, intra EU-15 trade is excluded, and Central and Eastern 
Europe are classified as OECD. The tariff data are bound rates. Applied rates are in general lower. 
 
This table shows that countries levy substantial tariffs in agriculture of about 30% of the import 
value against world prices. The OECD levies relatively higher tariffs on import from the OECD 
than from imports originating from the non-OECD. One of the reasons is that the OECD 
imports consist, relatively, of much processed food from other OECD countries, which is 
subject to higher import tariffs than (basic) agricultural products from non-OECD countries. 
Export tariffs and subsidies are also significant. The OECD subsidises its agriculture exports, 
while the developing countries raise export taxes of about 2.5%. The general feeling is that the 
gains from liberalising agricultural policies are large. They could even outweigh the gains of 
liberalising trade in manufacturing goods, because current trade and production patterns in 
agriculture are severely distorted. 
Table 3.4 also shows that OECD countries do not levy significant import tariffs in 
manufacturing, regardless of whether these are imported from other high income countries or 
the developing ones. The non-OECD countries levy tariffs of about 10% of the import prices. 
At the world level, the average import tariff is much lower because most trade takes place 
within the OECD. The numbers in table 3.4 are from 1997. Current applied tariffs are probably 
even lower. 
The table also shows that if developing countries export their manufactures, they face higher 
import tariffs, on average, than OECD countries. WTO (2001) argues that tariffs are relatively 
high in sectors that are important for developing countries, such as textiles and clothing, leather 
and other labour-intensive goods. From that perspective, the gains of further trade liberalisation 
in manufacturing could be relatively large for the developing countries. 
OECD countries do not levy import tariffs at all in the service sectors, and those of the 
developing countries do not exceed a half percent of the import value. In services, import tariffs   24 
have never been important. Trade in services, however, is hampered by three other types of 
barriers (Hoekman and Braga, 1997). The first is quotas and prohibitions. This is the case in, for 
instance, landing rights for airplanes. Secondly, price regulations form an impediment to trade. 
Airport and tourist taxes, for example, reduce the demand for tourist services. Finally, there is 
sometimes discriminatory access to distribution networks. For instance, foreign providers are 
not always granted access to distribution networks. This not only hampers trade, but also 
reduces competition. 
It therefore seems logical to incorporate non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in the model. These 
NTBs are important not only in services, but also in manufacturing and agriculture. Various 
restrictions fall under the heading of non-tariff barriers (NTB), such as anti-dumping and 
countervailing actions, non-automatic licensing and (voluntary) export restraints. The Uruguay 
round was aimed at reducing these barriers in manufacturing, and was fairly successful. Most of 
the NTBs apply to food processing, beverages and tobacco, and textiles and apparel. NTBs also 
include intentional and unintentional restrictions on international trade that stem from 
regulating product characteristics and production methods. Concerns for health, safety, the 
environment, and consumer protection are legitimate grounds for member states to restrict 
imports from other member states. These obstacles to trade are often referred to as technical 
barriers. 
Quantification of the NTBs is based on Lejour et al. (2004). We estimated the sectoral NTBs 
based on the idea that the (empirical) differences in trade intensity between EU-15 countries and 
between non-EU countries can be ascribed to the EU internal market.
10 The measures taken to create 
the EU internal market were directed to eliminate barriers to trade. We assume that the differences in 
trade intensity between inter and intra EU trade can be ascribed to NTBs. Table 3.5 presents these 
barriers. 
 
Table 3.5  Non tariff barrier (as ratio of import value) 
Sector  NTB     Sector  NTB 
       
Agriculture  21.7     Capital Goods  10.6 
Energy  0.0     Transport services  0.6 
Raw Materials  0.0     Construction  12.6 
Consumption Goods  9.7     Trade services  22.2 
Food Processing  14.0     Communication  0.0 
Paper, printing, publishing  13.7     Financial services  0.0 
Chemicals and minerals  2.5     Business services  17.6 
Metals  0.0     Other services  4.8 
 
Source: own calculations, based on Lejour et al. (2004) and Nahuis (2002). 
 
 
10 Note that the differences in trade intensity are corrected for differences in GDP per capita, import tariffs and distances 
between the countries by using a gravity model.   25 
3.3  Scenario-specific trends 
This section gives an overview of the scenario-specific trends. These trends determine the 
variation between the scenarios in two ways: directly, because the exogenous trends differ 
between the scenarios; and indirectly, because these differences imply also the variation in the 
model outcomes. Here we briefly review the variation in exogenous inputs. The succeeding 
chapters describe these inputs and the results in greater detail. 
 
Table 3.6   Variation in exogenous inputs 








         
Population and labour         
         
Population growth EU-15  high  moderate  low  high 
Population growth other regions  low  high  moderate  low 
Migration to EU-15  high  moderate  low  high 
Participation rate EU-15  moderate  high  low  high 
Unemployment rate EU-15  moderate  low  high  low 
         
Technology and growth         
         
Labour productivity EU-15  moderate  moderate/high  low  high 
Relative TFP growth  baseline  high in services 
and capital goods 
baseline  baseline 
Energy efficiency
a  high  low  high  low 
Climate-change policy
  yes  no  no  no 
         
Capital and investment         
         
Savings policy  yes  no  no   yes 
Capital mobility  high  moderate  low  high 
         
Trade         
         
Global trade barriers  low  moderate  high  low 
Deepening internal market EU  substantial  modest  substantial   modest 
 
Note that terms like low, moderate, and high are used to describe the development of a trend in a scenario compared to the development 
in other scenarios. It is not meant to characterise differences between various trends in one scenario. 
aThe variation in energy efficiency and climate-change policy will be discussed in a new CPB publication on climate-change and energy 
scenarios. That study uses the same scenarios as here, but lays the emphasis on energy markets. 
 
The exogenous trends are subdivided into four categories. Each category is discussed in one of 
the succeeding chapters. These chapters discuss the population and labour, technology and 
growth, capital and investment, and trade. Discussion of these topics goes beyond the 
motivation and variation in exogenous inputs to include the outcomes of the model. From a 
modelling perspective, it is not obvious to combine the presentation of exogenous and 
endogenous trends. The reason for doing so is that the focus is on the scenarios. The   26 
characteristics of scenarios are always a combination of exogenous trends and endogenous 
outcomes.  
This section aims to discriminate between the exogenous trends and model outcomes. As 
discussed earlier in the chapter, the model emphasises economic growth and trade relations. 
Population developments and labour inputs are exogenous. Chapter 4, which deals with these 
issues, presents the exogenous trends in population and labour. In Chapter 5, the modelling 
mechanisms come in. Economic growth is the result of technology, which is exogenous, 
exogenous labour inputs and capital. Because the macro TFP growth is more or less based on 
the expected outcomes for GDP growth, the results in this chapter are heavily based on the 
assumptions on the trends. 
The model establishes a direct relation between macro TFP growth and GDP per capita 
growth. Take a simple production function in which output is produced with technology, labour 
and capital. In a balanced growth path, output and capital will have similar growth rates. The 
growth of labour inputs depends on labour supply, which is exogenous in the model. The size of 
TFP growth thus determines GDP (per capita) growth or vice versa— as we are able to target 
GDP per capita growth and the macro TFP growth rate. We may choose between determining 
TFP growth or GDP growth. Both options have their merits. In considering scenarios, we form 
opinions on GDP growth (and not directly on TFP growth, which is the unobserved growth 
variable). This suggests targeting GDP per capita growth directly. However, we also include in 
the model certain characteristics, such as globalisation, which have (temporary) growth effects. 
Targeting GDP means that these growth effects appear only in the form of lower TFP growth. 
Because we want to see these growth effects, this is undesirable. We therefore target the macro 
TFP rate (or labour productivity), while having in mind a desired GDP per capita growth target.  
 Chapter 6 focuses on savings, investment, foreign capital and the interest rates. Savings are 
affected by savings policy, and capital mobility by the degree of capital-market integration. 
Those are scenario-specific assumptions. The model outcomes are the results of several 
endogenous mechanisms in the model. The discussion in this chapter therefore concentrates 
more on the model outcomes and less on the exogenous trends than chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 7 
discusses the trade relations of the EU with the rest of the world at a macro and sectoral level. 
The breakdown of trade barriers is an exogenous element in this chapter, but the development 
of the trade relations depends heavily on the mechanisms in the model. 
In chapters 4 to 7, the focus shifts from exogenous trends to the endogenous outcomes of 
WorldScan. Combining the several trends into four themes clarifies the presentation of the 
quantitative characteristics of the model.  
   27 
3.4  Conclusions 
This chapter introduced the model that we will use for the scenario analysis and provided an 
overview of the exogenous trends. Our dynamic CGE model WorldScan is well suited for 
scenario analysis. It is easy to implement exogenous demographic trends. Demography affects 
labour supply and thereby economic growth and the savings rate. Employment growth is 
affected not only by demography, but also by participation rates and unemployment rates. 
Labour-market participation and unemployment are influenced by the generosity or tightness of 
the social security system. In this way, developments in the public sector— one of the key 
uncertainties in the scenarios—impact the economy to the extent that these developments affect 
labour-market participation and unemployment. Technology is implemented by the rate of 
technological progress. This affects labour productivity directly. Trends in energy developments 
can be simulated by energy efficiency and energy taxes. The trade barriers and imperfect capital 
mobility in the model help to steer the degree of globalisation in the various scenarios— the 
other key uncertainty in the scenarios.    28   29 
4  Population and labour 
This chapter highlights the population and labour-supply developments. First we present the population 
scenarios for the EU and the other regions. Then we discuss the participation rates in the various 
scenarios. Population developments and participation rates together determine labour supply. The last 
section shows that these developments have much more impact on employment growth than on 
unemployment rates. The ageing population will lead to a smaller labour force unless labour-market 
participation of the elderly is raised substantially.  
4.1  Population growth 
European Union 
Population growth differs in the scenarios. The demographic developments in the EU-15 are 
based on the projections of Eurostat. A few years ago, Eurostat (2000) constructed three 
population scenarios until 2050: a base scenario, a high-population variant, and a low-
population variant. 
 In the base (or mid) scenario, 600 thousand people migrate to the EU-15 each year. The 
fertility rate ranges from 1.42 children in Spain to 1.82 in Ireland in 2020. The life expectancy 
at birth is on average 78 years for males and 82 years for females in 2020. We use this 
population scenario in Transatlantic Market. 
 In Eurostat’s high-population variant, migration flows, life expectancy and fertility are 
higher. Immigrants amount to 900,000 people (net) per year, the fertility rate is about 0.25 
points higher, and life expectancy for males and females are about 2.5 and 3 years higher in 
2020, respectively. These assumptions are based on the assumptions that economic growth is 
high and/or that there is a stronger focus on immaterial issues. We use this population scenario 
in Global Economy and in Strong Europe. 
 In the low-population variant, only 300,000 migrants enter Europe each year. Fertility is 0.2 
points lower than in the base scenario, and life expectancy is 2 and 1.5 years lower for men and 
women, respectively, in 2020. In this population scenario, Eurostat assumes that economic 
growth is low. This corresponds to our Regional Communities scenario. 
 There is one caveat here. Eurostat’s high- and low-population variants are extreme 
scenarios that depict the boundaries of the possible population developments; as such, they are 
less plausible than the baseline. This does not fit in our economic scenarios.
11 Therefore, we 
reduced the variation between the baseline and the high and low variant by a third. Population 
developments in these scenarios are thus less extreme than the original high and low variant of 
the Eurostat scenarios.  
 
11 We discussed this issue and our solution to that problem with the demographers that constructed these population 
scenarios.   30 
Figure 4.1 presents the effects of these assumptions on population growth in the EU-15. In 
Transatlantic Market, population grows on average by 0.2% per year until 2020. After 2020, the 
population shrinks slightly. In Strong Europe and Global Economy, the population grows 0.2% 
faster until 2020, and even 0.3% after 2020, compared to Transatlantic Market. In Regional 
Communities, the population grows slower than in Transatlantic Market: 0.2% until 2020, and 
0.3% after 2020. The assumptions on fertility, migration and life expectancy also affect the 
speed of ageing in the population. 
 In Regional Communities, 27.7% of the population in the EU-15 is older than 65 in 2040. 
In 2000, this is only 16.3%. In Transatlantic Market this is 27.9%, and in Strong Europe and 
Global Economy it is 26.5% in 2040. The ageing of the population will materialise in a higher 
old-age dependency ratio (i.e. the ratio between the old, inactive generation and the young, 
working generation). De Mooij and Tang (2003) show that this ratio is expected to increase in 
all industrialised countries. Whereas for every pensioner there are roughly four workers in 





































12 CPB (2000) and De Mooij and Tang (2003) discuss extensively the phenomenon of ageing and its consequences for the 
labour market and public sector.    31 
EU migration 
The Eurostat population scenarios do not take account of possible migration flows due to the 
enlargement of the European Union. We want to take account of the migration flows. Although 
forecasting the migration effect of EU enlargement is inherently difficult, a number of 
researchers have made an attempt. These studies all use previous experiences to estimate the 
effect of income disparities (and other explanatory variables like unemployment or distance) on 
international migration. These estimates are then applied to the income differentials between the 
EU-15 and the CEECs. Thus, they arrive at an estimate of the migration effect of EU 
enlargement. We have collected twelve such studies.
13 A median estimate is 2.9 million people. 
There is, however, quite some variation among the studies. The majority of estimates indicates 
somewhere between 1 and 4 million migrants.  
We assume that the median estimate of 2.9 million is the immigration flow for the period 
2000 to 2040. It corresponds to a long-term migration effect of about 2.5% of the total 
population in the CEECs. Most of these people will come in the first years after the 
enlargement. The flow will vanish because income differentials will diminish in time. In 
Regional Communities, the enlargement process will not be completed. There will be no free 
movement of labour, and migration flows will remain limited. In Transatlantic Market, this 
migration flow from Central Europe is larger because the income differences between Central 
and Western Europe remain larger.
14 
 In Strong Europe and Global Economy, Turkey will become a full member of the EU, 
which also implies that people are free to migrate between the EU and Turkey. As an educated 
guess, we used the implicit elasticity from the studies for the CEEC to make such an 
assessment. In particular, Turkish GNP per capita (measured in purchasing power parities in 
1999) is 31% of the EU-15 average, which is somewhat below the average of the CEECs. 
Applying the implicit wage elasticity of migration to the income differential with Turkey yields 
an estimate of the migration potential from Turkey to the European Union. Thereby, we take 
account of the demographic development in Turkey. The Turkish population is expected to 
increase from 65 million inhabitants in 2000 to more than 100 million in 2040. Applying the 
Turkish population of 2040, we guess that 3.4 million people will migrate from 2015 until 
2040. 
Table 4.1   Migration flows to EU-15 due to enlargement (in millions, 2000-2040) 








         
Central Europe  2.9  4.0  1.1  2.9 
Turkey  3.4  0.0  0.0  3.4 
 
Source: De Mooij and Tang (2003). 
 
13 De Mooij and Tang (2003) present the results of these studies. 
14 Table 5.4 shows that Central Europe will catch up to EU-15 productivity levels in Strong Europe and Global Economy, but 
less so in Transatlantic Market and Regional Communities.   32 
The rest of the world 
For the regions outside the EU-15, we use the population projections constructed by RIVM for 
the scenarios of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). For Strong Europe and 
Global Economy, we use the same IPCC population scenario. That scenario indicates rapid 
changes in population development— from high mortality rates and high fertility rates toward 
much lower rates in the developing world. This rapid transition reflects social and educational 
developments in Strong Europe and economic developments in Global Economy (IPCC, 2000). 
The population scenario in Transatlantic Market is characterised by a slower transition path. 
This is motivated by slower economic and social developments in the developing countries 
compared to the scenarios Strong Europe and Global Economy. As a result, mortality rates and 
fertility rates do not decline rapidly. As a consequence, population growth in Transatlantic 
Market is a bit higher than in Strong Europe and Global Economy, due to higher fertility rates. 
The population is on average also younger than in Strong Europe and Global Economy. A 
higher share of youngsters in the population implies a lower macro participation rate. 
The differences between the scenarios are relatively modest compared to the variation 
between the regions. In the non-OECD, all population scenarios project an annual increase in 
the population of more than 1% per year. In the US, the size of the population increases also 
relatively fast, while in the Rest OECD and Eastern Europe the population hardly grows or even 
shrinks. 
The relation between economic and population developments in the EU-15 and the non-
OECD are each opposite in the scenarios. The population in the EU-15 increases more rapidly if 
economic growth is high, due to greater life expectancy, higher fertility and higher migration 
flows. In the non-OECD, the transition path in population development is more rapid if 
economic growth is high, such that fertility declines more rapidly. These differences can be 
traced back to the differences in the income levels in both regions.  
 
Table 4.2   Population growth, annual averages 2000-2040 
      Strong Europe     Transatlantic Market  Regional Communities       Global Economy 
    00-20  20-40  00-20  20-40  00-20  20-40  00-20  20-40 
                   
EU    0.4  0.2  0.2  -0.1  0.0  -0.3  0.4  0.2 
Eastern Europe  0.2  0.0  0.4  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.0 
United States  0.8  0.6  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.3  0.8  0.6 
Rest OECD  0.2  -0.1  0.2  -0.1  0.2  -0.1  0.2  -0.1 
Non-OECD  1.3  0.7  1.7  1.3  1.4  0.9  1.3  0.7 
 
Source: Eurostat (2000) and own calculations for EU-15, and IPCC (2000) for other regions. 
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4.2  Labour-market participation 
In the coming decades participation rates in the OECD are affected by four factors: 
demographic changes, social security, participation rates of women and participation of the 
elderly. We deal with each of these factors in turn, and also discuss the scenario-specific 
content of each of them. For the non-OECD we do not make scenario-specific assumptions on 
the social security systems and participation rates of women and the elderly.  
Ageing 
Demography is important because labour-market participation of people between 25 and 60 
years of age is much higher than for other age groups. Due to ageing, a larger share of the 
population will be older than 65. This reduces the macro participation rates. This is also the 
baseline of Lejour and Van Leeuwen (2002), who project participation rates until 2040 based on 
historical participation rates of the ILO. Ageing is a common factor in all scenarios. Given the 
various population scenarios and correspondingly different population composition, the impact 
on labour-market participation is not identical in all scenarios.  
Social security system 
A generous social security system stimulates the incentives of people to use that system. The 
opposite of that is a meagre system that stimulates labour market participation, as the entry and 
income transfers of such a system are not attractive. The generosity of social security systems 
varies between the scenarios. Strong Europe and Regional Communities feature a focus on 
equity. Social security systems are relatively generous. In Regional Communities, all existing 
arrangements are kept in place. Figure 4.2 also shows that participation rates of persons 
between the ages of 20 to 65 hardly change. In Strong Europe the social security system is 
generous, but people are aware of the economic problems of an ageing society. Although social 
benefits are still high, the demands for receiving a benefit become stricter. The participation 
rates will consequently be a bit higher than in Regional Communities. Transatlantic Market and 
Global Economy focus more on efficiency than on equity. Social security systems are less 
generous. The low social benefits increase labour-market participation rates. 
Participation rates of women 
Labour-market participation of women between 25 and 55 years is about 30%-points lower than 
that of men in the OECD. Twenty years ago, the difference was much larger. Participation rates 
of women are rising, and the difference in participation rates is diminishing. In our baseline 
projection we assume that the trend of rising participation will continue until 2040, independent 
of the scenario.    34 
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Participation of the elderly 
After the age of 55, the participation of men on the labour market declines sharply. While the 
participation rate of men between the ages of 60 and 64 was about 80% in 1950, it is now only 
50% in the OECD. Some reasons for this decline include the introduction of early retirement 
programs and an expanded social security system. Regional Communities is a scenario in which 
existing rules and policies will continue. The early retirement arrangements stimulate the trend 
towards low participation of the elderly. Due to ageing, the macro-participation rate declines to 
40% in 2040 for the EU-15 as a whole. This is a decline of about 6% compared to 2000. Figure 
4.2 shows that this decline is fully due to the changing age structure of the population. The 
participation rates for population aged 20 to 65 stays more or less constant between 2000 and 
2040, while the participation rate for the total population drops. Strong Europe also emphasises 
solidarity between different groups in the population, but people are aware of the economic 
problems of an ageing society. Early retirement programs become fiscally less attractive. As a 
result, participation of those aged 20 to 65 will increase by about 5%-points. The macro 
participation rates in 2040 will be about 1% higher in Strong Europe than in Regional 
Communities. 
In Transatlantic Market and Global Economy, people are stimulated to stay employed even 
after the age of 65. The low social benefits, including the pension benefits of the PAYG 
systems, increase participation rates of the elderly, both men and women. In Transatlantic 
Market, labour-market participation of men between the ages of 60 and 64 increases from about 
50% to 60% in the OECD, and in Global Economy it increases to 70%. Early-retirement 
arrangements are skipped, and it becomes fiscally more attractive to retire after the age of 65, 
instead of earlier. 30% of the men and 18% of the women aged 65 to 69 participate in the labour 
market in that scenario. As a result, the participation rate in 2040 (measured as share of total 
 
15 The numerator in these ratios includes everybody who participates, including those 65 years and older. The high ratios for 
the group aged 20 to 65 years also include participation of the elderly. Without that group, labour-market participation of the 
population aged 20 to 65 would be about 5%-points lower.   35 
population) is at about the same levels as in 2000 in the EU-15, and increases to nearly 88% as 
share of the group aged 20 to 65. 
 
Table 4.3   Participation rates (as ratio of total population) 
         Past 
 
      Strong 
      Europe 
  Transatlantic 
      Market   
      Regional  
      Communities 
      Global 
      Economy 
  1980  2000  2020  2040  2020  2040  2020  2040  2020  2040 























49.9  49.4  48.9  45.7  48.7  44.1  48.5  45.1  48.9  45.7 
United States  47.1  50.4  48.8  46.5  48.0  44.8  48.2  44.8  48.8  46.5 
Rest OECD  46.6  51.4  48.5  44.6  49.9  47.7  47.1  41.7  49.8  47.6 
Non-OECD  41.5  46.3  49.8  50.7  47.2  46.8  49.2  49.3  49.8  50.7 
 
Source: Lejour and van Leeuwen (2002). Numbers in parentheses are participation rates as share of the age group 20 to 65 years. 
 
The drop in participation (as a share of total population) in the EU-15 is thus due to population 
developments. The labour-market participation of those between 20 and 65 years of age 
increases in nearly all scenarios. In Global Economy, this rate even increases to 88%. 
 
4.3  Employment growth 
 With respect to unemployment, the institutional settings in Regional Communities will not be 
changed. We assume that the unemployment rates will be similar to those in 2000. However, in 
Transatlantic Market and Global Economy, the EU-15 chooses to reform institutions to a more 
American type of labour-market setting. There will be less income protection and solidarity. 
This increases the incentives for the unemployed to find a job, and decreases the burden for 
employers to attract employees. We assume that the unemployment rates will decrease to about 
4% of the labour force in the OECD. In Strong Europe, governments combine a more active 
labour-market policy with a generous social security system. The social security systems are 
reformed to limit entry and to stimulate exit, but benefit levels are not reduced. As a result, 
unemployment will decrease—but not as fast as in Transatlantic Market and Global Economy.   36 
 
Table 4.4   Unemployment rates (as ratio of labour force) 
 
        Past 
 
        Strong 
        Europe 
        Transatlantic 
        Market 
        Regional  
        Communities 
      Global 
      Economy 
  2000  2020  2040  2020  2040  2020  2040  2020  2040 
                   
EU-15  8.5  7.1  5.8  6.2  3.9  8.4  8.3  6.2  3.9 
Eastern Europe  10.8  9.7  8.5  9.0  7.2  10.7  10.6  8.1  5.5 
United States  4.1  4.0  4.0  3.6  3.0  4.1  4.1  3.5  3.0 
Rest OECD  4.8  4.4  4.0  4.4  4.0  4.8  4.8  4.4  4.0 
Non-OECD  9.9  9.9  9.9  10.2  10.5  9.9  9.9  10.2  10.6 
 
Source: World Bank (2001) for numbers in the year 2000 and own assumptions. For the non-OECD regions, we assumed constant 
unemployment rates because we do not analyse the labour market in these regions. 
 
The assumptions on unemployment rates together with the demographic trends and labour 
supply determine employment growth. Figure 4.3 shows that employment decreases in the EU-
15 and becomes even negative in some scenarios. In Global Economy, employment growth is 
positive, while it is negative in Regional Communities. 
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In Global Economy and Transatlantic Market, employment growth exceeds population growth 
by 0.1%-points, while in the other scenarios employment growth is about 0.3%-points lower. 
These differences are related to the type of institutions in the scenarios. 
Table 4.5 decomposes these differences into two components: changes in labour supply and 
changes in involuntary unemployment. The developments in labour supply cause the largest 
disparities among the various scenarios. In light of population ageing, labour supply contracts 
due to a lower participation rate. In Global Economy, this reduction in participation is offset by 
policies to encourage the participation of younger generations and by increasing the effective 
retirement age. To a smaller degree, also Transatlantic Market and Strong Europe mitigate the 
downward trend in the participation rate. In Regional Communities, participation drops most 
substantially because no policies to stimulate the participation rate are developed. 
Apart from participation, also different trends in the population affect labour-supply 
developments. In Regional Communities, we observe from table 4.5 a shrinking population, 
which further reduces labour supply. In Global Economy and Strong Europe, immigration 
offsets the decline in labour supply. Overall, labour supply grows in Global Economy, while it 
remains more or less constant in Strong Europe and Transatlantic Market. Only in Regional 
Communities does labour supply fall substantially in the coming decades.  
From table 4.5, we see that the decline in unemployment rates is relatively unimportant for 
employment growth, as compared to the developments in labour supply. In Regional 
Communities, unemployment rates do not fall. In the other scenarios, labour-market reforms are 
responsible for a drop in unemployment, so that this contributes to a rise in employment. 
Table 4.5  The contributing factors to employment growth in the EU-15 2000-2040 








         
Employment  0.1  0.1  -0.5  0.4 
 Labour supply  0.0  0.0  -0.5  0.2 
 of which population  0.3  0.0  -0.2  0.3 
               participation  -0.3  -0.1  -0.4  0.0 
 Unemployment  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1 
 
Source: WorldScan and IPCC (2000). Note that a decrease in the unemployment rate contributes positively to employment growth. A ‘+’ 
sign in the row for unemployment implies a lower unemployment rate. 
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4.4  Conclusions 
In all scenarios population growth diminishes in Europe. In Regional Communities and 
Transatlantic Market, population even shrinks after 2020. These developments do not take place 
only in Europe. Worldwide, population growth will diminish in the coming fifty years. Apart 
from its size, the population will also change in terms of composition. In Europe, the ratio of the 
elderly in the total population will increase. The scenarios show that without changes in the age-
specific labour-market participation rates, macro participation will fall, and harm employment 
growth. Then, employment growth will not match population growth (which occurs in Regional 
Communities). Other scenarios show that if labour-market participation can be raised, then the 
fall in the macro participation rate will be less severe or even negligible. The latter is possible 
only if the participation of those aged 20 to 65 increases from 73% to 88%. This occurs in 
Global Economy, where labour supply increases to such an extent that employment growth is 
positive and exceeds population growth. In this scenario, ageing hardly affects the labour 
market. In the other scenarios, employment growth is stagnant or even negative. This chapter 
thus shows that ageing in the EU-15 will diminish employment growth and eventually even lead 
to a smaller labour force. However if the labour-market participation of the elderly is raised 
substantially, employment growth can even surpass population growth.  
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5  Economic growth and technology 
This chapter focuses on labour productivity and growth. We discuss the assumptions on labour 
productivity growth in the various scenarios and their implications for economic growth and growth per 
capita. Declining employment growth in time induced by ageing diminishes GDP and GDP per capita 
growth. The comparison of labour productivity developments shows that Central and Eastern Europe and 
Turkey catch up to the EU-15 in Strong Europe and Global Economy. Finally, we turn our attention to 
sectoral growth patterns. 
The previous chapter used our assumptions on population growth, participation and 
unemployment to derive employment growth in the various scenarios for the EU-15 and the 
other regions. Employment and labour productivity together determine production and growth. 
That is the topic of this chapter. First, we present the assumptions on labour productivity growth 
(or implicitly on total factor productivity). Then, we derive the implications for economic 
growth. Given population developments, we know growth per capita. We analyse these results 
and compare these developments in the different regions. Finally, we discuss the sectoral 
production structure, and examine the developments of the service economy and sectoral 
growth patterns. 
5.1  Labour productivity 
Strong Europe and Global Economy are the globalisation scenarios represented by successful 
trade-liberalisation rounds, increasing capital mobility and large migration flows. Economic 
growth is higher in Global Economy because of more technology spillovers and a more rapid 
catching up of the developing countries (represented in higher TFP growth). The differences in 
labour productivity growth between Strong Europe and Transatlantic Market are mainly 
affected by various globalisation characteristics, and by more TFP growth in ICT and other 
services in the EU-15. Global Economy sees increased TFP growth compared to Strong Europe. 
Regional Communities has a lower TFP growth rate, since TFP growth is more biased to 
manufacturing and is very low in services. 
 
Table 5.1 presents the annual average growth rates in labour productivity for the sub-periods 
2000-2020 and 2020-2040. The growth in labour productivity is heavily based on the growth in 
TFP and the capital-labour ratio. In Strong Europe, labour productivity grows according to its 
historical path of the last decades in the EU. In Central and Eastern Europe (including the 
Former Soviet Union and Turkey), it grows much faster due to catching up to the EU-15. 
Labour productivity in the non-OECD also grows fast. 
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Table 5.1  Labour productivity growth, annual averages 2000-2040 
      Strong Europe     Transatlantic Market  Regional Communities       Global Economy 
    00-20  20-40  00-20  20-40  00-20  20-40  00-20  20-40 
                   
EU    1.6  1.4  1.9  1.8  1.2  1.0  2.1  2.0 
Eastern Europe  3.9  3.4  2.9  2.3  2.5  2.0  4.1  3.5 
United States  1.6  1.2  2.2  1.8  1.4  1.0  2.3  1.8 
Rest OECD  1.3  1.1  1.3  1.2  1.2  0.9  1.7  1.9 
Non-OECD  3.3  3.5  1.9  1.5  2.4  2.3  3.8  3.9 
                 
Source: WorldScan.                 
 
In Transatlantic Market, labour productivity in the EU-15 is larger, due to the ICT 
developments that affect productivity in capital goods, telecommunications and (indirectly) 
most other services sectors. Growth in the non-OECD is among the lowest in the world. Lack of 
economic integration with the OECD and other non-OECD countries prevents the inflow of 
foreign direct investment and technology spillovers. The investment climate in these countries 
is unstable, due to political and social unrest.  
In Regional Communities, labour productivity growth is lower. No important innovations 
spur economic growth. That is the case for nearly all regions. In the non-OECD, labour 
productivity growth is higher than in Transatlantic Market because the investment climate is 
much better than in the latter scenario. 
Global Economy focuses on a smooth functioning of national and international goods and 
services markets. Innovation and fierce competition spur labour productivity all over the world. 
Table 5.1 shows that the spread between labour productivity growth rates is 1%-point. As 
we see below, that explains a large part of the variation in GDP growth. From the table it also 
follows that growth is about 0.1%-points to 0.2%-points lower in the period 2020-2040 than in 
the period 2000-2020 in the EU, while sectoral TFP growth is constant over time. The main 
reason for this result is the structural shift from manufacturing towards more services. Macro 
labour productivity growth is the aggregate of sectoral growth, and service sectors inhibit 
productivity growth less than the former sectors. This mechanism also explains the fall in 
labour productivity growth in the US and Eastern Europe. Besides that mechanism, the growth 
of the capital-labour ratio affects labour productivity growth. Rapid capital growth in Strong 
Europe and Global Economy, for example, raises labour productivity growth in the non-OECD.  
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5.2  Economic growth 
The developments in labour productivity and employment growth determine GDP growth. The 
numbers in table 5.2 are thus the sum of those in table 4.5 and table 5.2 (for the EU-15). The 
pattern of GDP growth is similar to that of labour productivity growth. Therefore, we focus 
only on the differences with table 5.1. 
Table 5.2  GDP growth, annual averages 2000-2040 
      Strong Europe     Transatlantic Market  Regional Communities       Global Economy 
    00-20  20-40  00-20  20-40  00-20  20-40  00-20  20-40 
                   
EU    1.8  1.3  2.3  1.6  1.1  0.2  2.7  2.3 
Eastern Europe  4.1  3.2  3.4  2.3  2.6  1.5  4.4  3.3 
United States  2.3  1.5  3.0  2.2  2.0  0.9  3.0  2.2 
Rest OECD  1.2  0.6  1.4  0.9  1.0  0.2  1.8  1.6 
Non-OECD  5.0  4.3  3.6  2.8  4.1  3.2  5.5  4.6 
World  2.7  2.4  2.7  2.0  2.1  1.4  3.4  2.9 
                 
Source: WorldScan.                 
 
Between 2000 and 2020, GDP growth varies between 1.1% and 2.7%; between 2020 and 2040, 
it varies between 0.2% and 2.3%. The variation in growth is thus twice as high as in labour 
productivity. This is caused by the developments in employment growth. In scenarios with low 
economic growth (such as Regional Communities), employment growth is also low. The latter 
is due to low population growth, low labour-market participation rates and high unemployment 
rates. In Global Economy, all these three factors work in an opposite direction, and the 
developments in employment and labour productivity growth reinforce each other. The decline 
in GDP growth is also larger than for labour productivity, due to the sizable changes in 
employment growth over time.  
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The variation in GDP per capita is smaller because high GDP growth is partly offset by high 
population growth in per capita terms for the EU-15. The variation between the scenarios is 
1.4%-points. In Regional Communities, GDP per capita growth is on average 0.8% per year, 
and in Global Economy 2.2% per year. This implies that per capita income is about 30% to 
130% higher in 2040 than in 2000. High population growth in the non-OECD also narrows the 
differences in GDP per capita growth between the regions. Note that the growth rate of about 
4% in the CEECs and the non-OECD in the period until 2020 is comparable to that of the Asian 
tigers in the recent past.  
The differences in per capita GDP between Strong Europe and Transatlantic Market are 
relatively large in the EU-15, compared to that of labour productivity and GDP. Relatively high 
population growth in Strong Europe slows down growth in per capita terms.  
 
Table 5.3  GDP growth per capita, annual averages 2000-2040 
       Strong Europe     Transatlantic Market  Regional Communities        Global Economy 
    00-20  20-40  00-20  20-40  00-20  20-40  00-20  20-40 
                   
EU    1.4  1.1  2.1  1.7  1.1  0.5  2.3  2.1 
Eastern Europe  3.9  3.1  3.0  1.9  2.5  1.6  4.2  3.3 
United States  1.5  0.9  2.0  1.5  1.3  0.6  2.2  1.5 
Rest OECD  1.0  0.7  1.2  1.0  0.8  0.3  1.6  1.7 
Non-OECD  3.6  3.6  1.9  1.5  2.7  2.3  4.1  3.9 
World  1.6  1.8  1.2  0.9  1.0  0.6  2.2  2.3 
                 
Source: WorldScan.                 
 
Growth in poorer regions exceeds that in Europe, also because of higher productivity growth. 
This is related to a process of catching up.
16 This pattern becomes clear from table 5.4, which 
shows the ratio of labour productivity between regions. More specifically, we explore the ratios 
between the EU-15 and the candidate members from Central and Eastern Europe, the EU-15 
and Turkey, Europe and the US, and the OECD and non-OECD countries.  
Table 5.4  Catching up in labour productivity between regions in 2040 





           
Central Europe to EU-15  13.8  32.4  20.0  20.8  25.7 
Turkey to EU-15  14.1  37.1  18.2  22.3  27.1 
EU-15 to US  80.5  83.8  75.9  78.1  76.2 
Non-OECD to OECD  8.4  17.3  7.9  13.0  15.9 
           
Source: WorldScan.           
 
 
16 The scenarios do not distinguish between rapidly growing and declining regions outside Europe. Indeed, the scenarios 
differ primarily with respect to developments within Europe.   43 
Table 5.4 shows that Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey catch up with the EU-15 in all 
scenarios. Convergence is the most rapid in Strong Europe, and the productivity ratio actually 
more than doubles. In the other scenarios, convergence is slower. In Transatlantic Market, 
productivity in Turkey hardly catches up with the EU-15 because Turkey shifts its economic 
attention to poorer Eastern neighbours, rather than to the richer European Union. 
The EU-15 outperforms productivity growth in the US in Strong Europe. Here, productivity 
levels catch up with those in the US, because of the relatively low productivity increases in the 
latter country. In other scenarios, labour productivity growth in the US actually exceeds that in 
Europe (because of the poor results regarding European integration, as is the case in Regional 
Communities, and to a lesser extent in Transatlantic Market).  
Table 5.4 shows that globalisation helps non-OECD countries to converge towards the 
OECD, at least in Strong Europe and Global Economy. The Transatlantic Market scenario 
features divergence between productivity levels. The rich industrialised countries integrate, 
while the poor non-OECD countries suffer from this development, remaining outsiders. 
5.3  Sectoral growth
17 
The growth of total GDP hides some important differences between sectors. In particular, some 
sectors will experience faster growth than others, while the relative performance of sectors may 
differ substantially among scenarios. 
Table 5.5 presents the value-added shares of four (aggregated) sectors for the years 2000 
and 2040. In each of the four scenarios, the service sector is growing relative to other sectors. 
Indeed, whereas this share is about 73% in 2000, it increases to between 81% (in Regional 
Communities) and 85% (in Global Economy) in 2040. The share of the Service sector varies 
between scenarios because of different developments in per capita income, combined with 
relatively high income elasticities for consumer services.
18 Hence, the faster the growth of 
welfare is, the larger will be the share of income that households spend on services. 
 
17 Note that these sectoral patterns for Europe are based on general developments in supply and demand and do not take 
account of specific sectoral market structures of the underlying countries. 
18 In Transatlantic Market, the share of services is lower than in Global Economy. This may seem strange because of the 
flourishing ICT sector in Transatlantic Market. Two reasons explain this result. First, the implementation of ICT leads to 
higher productivity and lower prices in service sectors. Second, the internal market with the US implies that Europe starts to 
import ICT services   44 
Table 5.5  Sectoral value added (as share of GDP (excluding taxes) in the EU-15) in 2040 





           
Agriculture and food  6.5  4.2  3.5  4.7  3.2 
Energy and raw materials  1.8  0.9  1.4  1.5  2.1 
Manufacturing  18.6  13.3  12.2  12.4  10.2 
Services  73.2  81.7  83.1  81.3  84.7 
 
Source: WorldScan; see the appendix for the aggregation of the 16 sectors into these four aggregated sectors. 
 
As a complement to the increase in the share of services in total value added, the shares of 
agriculture and manufacturing sectors decline. These sectors experience higher TFP growth 
than service sectors, so that relative prices of these sectors decline correspondingly. The low 
income elasticity for food further contributes to the decline in the demand for products from 
agriculture and food processing. The demand for energy and raw materials contracts in Strong 
Europe, Transatlantic Market and Regional Communities. In Global Economy, however, robust 
economic growth in combination with lax environmental policies makes growth relatively 
pollution-intensive. 
 
The different developments in TFP cause diverging developments in relative prices between 
sectors. Accordingly, the diverse growth rates in the volumes of production may show a 
different pattern than the trends in the shares of value added. Table 5.6 therefore presents 
growth in production volumes. It adopts a lower level of aggregation to investigate, in greater 
detail, which sectors gain relative to others. In general, table 5.5 and table 5.6 show different 
patterns. Sectors in which production volumes increase relatively quickly become less 
important in terms of value-added terms. The reason is that in these sectors production prices 
dwindle rapidly, and such production loses its relative value.  
 The production volume of trade and transport services increases relatively quickly in all 
scenarios compared to the other service sectors. This is due to increased trade volumes and 
rapid TFP growth, which keeps prices low. In general, changes in production volumes are most 
pronounced in scenarios with high GDP growth, such as Global Economy and Transatlantic 
Market. In Regional Communities, production volumes in agriculture and manufacturing 
sectors grow rapidly, while growth is relatively low in service sectors. In Transatlantic Market, 
the volume of the trade and transport sector and that of the capital goods sector grow rapidly, 
reflecting the emphasis on ICT production in that scenario.   45 
 
Table 5.6  Production growth of different sectors in the EU-15 (annual growth in %) 





         
Agriculture and food  1.7  1.8  1.1  2.6 
Energy and raw materials  0.4  1.9  0.9  3.4 
Chemicals and minerals  3.0  3.5  1.9  5.1 
Capital goods  2.0  3.2  0.8  3.5 
Other manufacturing  2.1  2.6  1.2  3.5 
Trade and transport  2.0  3.1  0.9  3.4 
Business services  1.6  2.1  0.6  2.4 
Other services  1.4  1.7  0.6  2.2 
 
Source: WorldScan; see the appendix for the aggregation of the 16 sectors into these 8 aggregated sectors. 
 
5.4  Conclusions 
GDP and GDP growth per capita in Europe will decline. In most scenarios the growth will be 
lower than in recent decades, due mainly to the decline in employment growth. Only if the 
decline is less outspoken, and labour productivity rises above its historical levels, can the GDP 
per capita exceed the 2% growth rate. Shrinking employment levels and low labour productivity 
growth could lead to very modest increases in GDP per capita. In Regional Communities, per 
capita GDP growth is only 0.5% per year, on average. In nearly all regions macro labour 
productivity growth diminishes, due to structural changes in the economy to less productive 
services.    46 
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6  Capital Markets 
This chapter focuses on capital markets. First, we discuss savings patterns for the various scenarios. 
Savings are shown to decline due to ageing. Differences in saving patterns around the world lead to 
capital flows from the non-OECD and Rest OECD to the EU. The size of the flows depends on the degree 
of capital mobility. The availability of regional savings, together with capital demand, determines the 
scarcity of capital in the scenarios. This affects the real interest rate; if economic growth is high and 
capital scarce, the real interest rate will increase (while it decreases otherwise). 
6.1  Savings 
In the globalisation scenarios Strong Europe and Global Economy we assume that capital 
market integration will increase. In these scenarios it will become easier for the OECD to attract 
capital from the non-OECD in order to finance investment, given the decreasing macro savings 
rates due to ageing. Moreover, we assume that governments in the EU-15 and the US are active 
in increasing savings by eliminating budget deficits and by stimulating private savings. This is 
reflected by higher macro savings rates of about 2%-points in 2020 and 2040. Governments do 
not follow these policies in Regional Communities and Transatlantic Market, and savings rates 
are subsequently lower. Besides that, in the fragmented world of Regional Communities, capital 
mobility is even reduced. Irrespective of these differences, figure 6.1 shows that saving rates in 
the EU-15 decline in all scenarios. 
 
Savings depend on GDP per capita growth, demographic characteristics and policy. Higher 
GDP growth stimulates savings, while ageing hinders it. As a result, savings are highest in 
Global Economy and lowest in Regional Communities (as confirmed in table 6.1). 
Even in Global Economy, national savings decline (as a share of national income) by 3%-
points. The effect of ageing on savings dominates the effects of higher GDP growth and a 
savings policy. Savings in the EU-15 are higher in Strong Europe than in Transatlantic Market, 
because of the savings policy in Strong Europe, which offsets lower GDP growth. In Regional 
Communities, savings implode to 12.7% of national income in the EU. Also in Eastern Europe, 
the United States and the Rest of the OECD, savings decline by about 6%-points in this 
scenario. The OECD (Turner et al., 1998) makes similar assumptions on the reduction in 
savings   48 
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Table 6.1  National savings (as ratio of national income) 
 
Past       Strong Europe   Transatlantic Market 
        Regional  
        Communities 
Global Economy 
  2000  2020  2040  2020  2040  2020  2040  2020  2040 
                   
EU-15  18.8  19.0  15.1  17.1  13.0  16.7  12.7  19.5  15.6 
Eastern Europe  22.7  22.7  18.4  22.5  17.2  21.9  16.6  22.7  18.2 
United States  17.5  17.1  14.9  15.7  14.2  14.5  11.1  17.5  15.3 
Rest OECD  26.6  22.5  19.3  22.5  19.3  22.4  19.2  23.0  19.7 
Non-OECD  26.1  29.4  25.9  26.6  21.8  28.5  23.8  29.8  26.1 
 
Source: WorldScan.  
 
In all scenarios savings are relatively high in the Rest OECD (in particular Japan) and the non-
OECD (Asia). These numbers suggest that these regions will be net lenders on the international 
capital market. Table 6.2 confirms this. The negative (positive) numbers imply that regions are 
borrowers (lenders). Brooks (2003) supports this view, showing in an overlapping generations 
model that in the coming decades the EU-15 and the US will be net borrowers on the 
international capital markets, and Japan and Asia net lenders.   49 
 
Table 6.2  Net foreign asset positions (as ratio of national income) 
 
Past       Strong Europe  Transatlantic Market 
        Regional 
        Communities 
Global Economy 
  2000  2020  2040  2020  2040  2020  2040  2020  2040 
                   
EU-15  - 0.8  -13.9  -35.3  -17.2  -29.3  -5.5  -9.9  -25.5  -72.4 
Eastern Europe  -10.2  -9.5  -15.2  5.9  11.8   1.4  2.1   4.9  10.5 
United States  -23.9  -12.8  -16.7  -25.1  -23.0  -17.9  -25.5  -21.7  -38.2 
Rest OECD  40.7  66.5  67.9  69.6  82.6  41.8  51.8  80.5  47.3 
Non-OECD  -1.0  -6.9  8.5  5.3  12.4  -0.7  3.9   0.7  39.2 
 
Source: WorldScan.  
 
Activating capital controls reduces the net foreign asset positions for countries in Regional 
Communities. There are fewer opportunities to lend to or borrow from other countries. These 
opportunities increase if capital controls are eliminated and international capital mobility is 
facilitated by measures like international bookkeeping standards in Strong Europe and Global 
Economy. It then becomes cheaper to borrow from abroad and more profitable to lend to other 
countries. This will lead to more extreme net positions in Global Economy. EU-15 and United 
States borrow relatively more on the international capital markets, and the non-OECD provides 
the capital.  
 
This result contrasts with the popular idea that the developed countries in the North will finance 
their future pensions by investing their funds in developing countries in the South. Without this 
possibility, higher savings in developed countries would sooner depress the rate of return on 
investment. With capital mobility, in contrast, higher savings in the North would not reduce the 
interest rate, as they can alternatively be invested in the South at relatively high rates of return. 
This idea should be qualified, however, for several reasons. First, the return to investment in 
poor countries is not necessarily higher than in rich countries, as is shown in table 6.2. The 
return seems conditional on several institutional factors. Second, many developing countries, 
especially in Asia, feature high savings rates themselves (see table 6.1). This implies that these 
countries do not need to import capital from the North. Third, ageing is not confined to 
developed countries: it is a worldwide phenomenon that also applies to developing countries. 
The demand for capital in developing countries may therefore fall as well. Finally, many 
impediments exist to cross-border capital flows. Developing countries would need to liberalise 
their financial markets so as to remove these impediments. But even when financial capital 
would be fully mobile, the return on investment may quickly fall when the pace of investment is 
high. The reason is that countries that expand and grow rapidly see their terms-of-trade 
deteriorate. This leads to a lower return on investment and limits the incentive to invest in 
rapidly growing countries.     50 
6.2  Investment and the real interest rate 
Savings and international capital markets determine the amount of capital that is available on 
the regional market. Investment determines the demand. Capital demand is closely related to 
economic growth in the scenarios. Demand for capital is high in Global Economy and low in 
Regional Communities. The differences between Strong Europe and Transatlantic Market are 
minor for the EU-15, although GDP growth is higher in Transatlantic Market. The reason is that 
higher GDP growth is spurred on by more technology and not by capital.  
Comparing regions, capital demand is high in Eastern Europe and the non-OECD. These are 
the fast-growing regions. 
 
Table 6.3  Capital demand, annual averages 2000-2040 
       Strong Europe     Transatlantic Market  Regional Communities       Global Economy 
    00-20  20-40  00-20  20-40  00-20  20-40  00-20  20-40 
                   
EU-15    2.3  2.0  2.3  1.9  1.7  0.8  2.8  3.1 
Eastern Europe  4.7  3.3  4.3  2.6  3.9  2.0  4.8  3.6 
United States  3.1  2.1  3.4  2.5  2.8  1.3  3.6  3.0 
Rest OECD  2.1  1.3  2.1  1.3  2.2  0.9  2.3  2.5 




Based on the demand for capital, we would expect that the price of capital is high in Global 
Economy and low in Regional Communities. However, the price of capital is also affected by 
the supply, which is high in Strong Europe and Global Economy and low in Regional 
Communities. Figure 6.2 shows that the pressure of capital demand seems to dominate the 
supply effect in Regional Communities. The real interest rate decreases from 3.6% in 2000 to 
2.6% in 2040. In Strong Europe, the real interest rate also decreases due to the abundant capital 
supply induced by savings policy and capital mobility in EU-15. In Transatlantic Market, the 
real interest rate rises in the EU-15. The supply of capital is limited (see figure 6.1), while 
demand is reasonably high. In Global Economy, the European real interest rate first rises before 
it starts to fall. The rise until 2015 is induced by high capital demand. After 2015, capital 
demand is still high, but the European Union benefits from the integrated capital markets. 
Savings in the non-OECD increase enormously. Although the savings rate is not much higher 
than in other scenarios for the non-OECD, savings themselves are much higher due to higher 
economic growth. The European Union benefits from this supply. They attract a lot of foreign 
capital.  
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The ample availability of capital in the non-OECD in Global Economy is also reflected by a 
low real interest rate, which falls from 5.3% in 2020 to 4.1% in 2040. In nearly all regions and 
scenarios real interest rates decrease. This would suggest that ageing causes an increase in the 
capital labour ratio such that capital becomes less scarce. The negative effect of ageing on 
employment growth seems to dominate the effect of dissavings of the elderly on capital growth 
in the OECD. High savings in Asia and its growing economic importance reinforces this effect.  
 
Table 6.4  Real interest rate 
        Past       Strong Europe   Transatlantic Market   Regional Communities           Global Economy 
  2000  2020  2040  2020  2040  2020  2040  2020  2040 
                   
EU-15  3.6  3.5  3.3  4.2  4.3  3.0  2.6  4.2  3.8 
Eastern Europe  5.5  3.8  2.9  3.4  2.7  2.9  2.2  4.2  3.1 
United States  5.2  4.0  3.5  4.8  4.7  4.1  3.9  4.5  3.8 
Rest OECD  3.3  2.2  1.6  2.5  2.1  1.6  1.0  3.0  2.2 
Non-OECD  4.4  4.8  3.6  4.4  3.9  4.3  3.2  5.3  4.1 
 
Source: WorldScan.  
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6.3  Conclusions 
This chapter focused on capital markets. It showed that savings in Europe would decline due to 
ageing. In the absence of any savings policy, savings as share of national income could decrease 
by 6%-points in 2040. This does not automatically imply that capital becomes very scarce in 
Europe. That depends on international capital mobility and economic growth. If international 
capital mobility increases, EU-15 could borrow capital from the Rest OECD and Asia. In the 
latter regions savings are very high. Capital mobility thus reduces the price of capital in Europe. 
Economic growth (and, consequently, investment demand) is at least as important for the 
scarcity of capital. In Regional Communities capital demand is very low; in spite of low 
savings, the real interest rate decreases in that scenario. In the high growth scenarios 
Transatlantic Market and Global Economy, the interest rates are relatively high in the EU-15. 
The net effect of ageing on the real interest rates in the EU-15 is thus unclear. At least as 
important is the rate of economic growth. Our scenarios suggest that the real interest rate could 
increase in the long run if economic growth is high. However, if international capital mobility 
increases, and economic growth is low, the real interest rate could decrease.   53 
7  Trade 
This chapter focuses on one of the central key uncertainties in the scenarios: regional and global 
cooperation on trade policies. First we describe these policies (such as the deepening of the EU internal 
market, EU enlargement with countries as Turkey, and global trade liberalisation). Global trade 
liberalisation increases the degree of openness of the EU. Trade policies also affect trade relations with 
other regions and the composition of trade. All these effects are discussed subsequently. We then shift the 
focus to the sectoral export pattern of the EU-15 and its comparative advantage. 
7.1  Trade-liberalisation policies 
Table 7.1 shows the various regional and global trade-liberalisation policies that we assume in 
the four scenarios. Within the EU-15, the internal market in goods and services (in particular) 
improves. This process is most prominent in Strong Europe and Regional Communities. In 
Transatlantic Market the internal market improves due to the creation of a European-American 
common market. Also in Global Economy the functioning of the internal market improves. 
Bilateral trade becomes increasingly important, and preferences for national goods seem to 
fade. 
 
Table 7.1  Trade-liberalisation policies 
Scenario  Strong Europe  Transatlantic Market  Regional Communities  Global Economy 
         
EU-15 internal market 
deepening 
substantial  modest  substantial  modest 
CEEC-EU-15  EMU  internal market  customs union  EMU 
Turkey-EU  internal market  -  -  internal market 
Russia-EU 
 






free trade area in 
manufacturing 
































Free trade area (FTA) implies that bilateral tariffs are eliminated. Customs union (CU) implies that members have common external tariffs 
towards third countries on top of FTA. Internal market implies that also NTBs are eliminated on top of CU. 
 
In all scenarios, the countries from Central and Eastern Europe will become EU members. They 
join the internal market, which implies a removal of all formal and informal barriers to trade. In 
Regional Communities, transitional periods for various aspects of the internal market take on a 
more permanent character (e.g. in agriculture and food), so that the EU accession effectively   54 
boils down to a Customs Union. At the same time, the current fifteen member states deepen 
their internal market, excluding the new member states. In Strong Europe and Global Economy, 
the candidate countries integrate beyond the internal market as they enter the EMU. Moreover, 
the EU enlarges with Turkey and concludes association agreements with Russia. 
In Strong Europe and Global Economy, global trade-liberalisation is successful and lead to a 
reduction in tariffs and NTBs between 2006-2015 and 2021-2030. In Strong Europe, all trade 
barriers and OECD domestic support in agriculture is eliminated, which gives the developing 
countries full access to the markets in the OECD countries. In Global Economy, trade 
liberalisation focuses more on market access in services. The Transatlantic Market scenario is 
characterised by more intense cooperation between the US, the EU and Latin America. Global 
trade liberalisation fails in Regional Communities. Instead, regional trade liberalisation 
arrangements are set up between the Americas in 2015. 
 
7.2   A redirection of trade 
The variation in regional and global trade policies leads to a diverse picture of openness in the 
scenarios. Table 7.2 presents the openness of the EU-15 and the other regions. Openness is 
measured as the average value of imports and exports divided by national income. It also 
includes intra EU-15 trade, which is an important share of total trade, as we will see below. 
Openness barely increases in Transatlantic Market and Regional Communities. In Transatlantic 
Market the common internal market with the US stimulates trade somewhat, and in Regional 
Communities trade increases through the deeper internal market of the current 15 EU members. 
The lack of openness to the rest of the world does not stimulate trade. 
 
Table 7.2  Openness of the various regions in 2040 








           
EU-15  29.5  45.7  33.4  33.5  43.0 
Eastern Europe  27.7  41.9  30.2  26.7  42.6 
US  11.5  18.4  12.5  11.0  19.3 
Rest OECD  15.5  29.7  18.0  17.9  29.0 
Non-OECD  21.7  25.7  25.3  15.9  31.5 
 
Source: WorldScan, regional; all aggregates include intra trade. 
 
This is completely different in Strong Europe and Global Economy, which both feature 
liberalised global trade. Not only are tariffs and non-tariff barriers lowered or even eliminated, 
but also trade is facilitated by more transparent and uniform customs procedures. The degree of 
openness increases by about 15%-points. In Strong Europe, openness is even higher than in   55 
Global Economy, due to the strong deepening of the internal market of the EU. This also 
stimulates intra EU-15 trade. Similar patterns also show up for the other regions. In the non-
OECD and Eastern Europe, openness is even reduced in Regional Communities. 
 
Changes in the openness of regions and differences in regional growth patterns affect also the 
size and direction of trade flows.
19 In Regional Communities, the value of world trade increases 
from 6000 billion US$ in 2000 to 9500 billion US$ in 2040. In Global Economy, it is a factor 
three higher: 27,000 billion US$. An increasing share of the trade takes place within the non-
OECD and between OECD and non-OECD regions. According to our statistics, nearly 40% of 
all trade takes place in the EU-15 in the year 2000. This decreases to about 30% in Strong 
Europe and Global Economy. In the other scenarios the share is a bit higher. These differences 
can be ascribed to the degree of globalisation and economic growth in the non-OECD in the 
former scenarios. The share of the non-OECD in total trade increases most significantly in 
Strong Europe and Global Economy— from 23% in the year 2000 to 35% in 2040.  
 






























EU15 Eastern Europe United States Rest OECD Non OECD  
 
19 Note that the size/magnitude of trade is here defined as the value of exports and imports in a region, divided by two. If the 
region is a composite of several WorldScan regions, trade also includes intra trade between these regions. The statistics on 
the size of the trade flows in 2000 cannot be compared to other data. The reason is that in constructing our 16 regions 
based on the more than 60 regions from the original database, we excluded intra trade. This implies that we ignore a lot of 
trade in Asia (which is one constructed region Rest of World), but represent relatively a lot of intra trade in Europe, because 
we distinguish eight regions there. We thus overestimate the share in total trade by the EU-15 in 2000. However, the relative 
changes in the size and direction of trade in the scenarios is not affected by the construction of regions.   56 
The magnitude of trade in the non-OECD increases two-fold in Regional Communities, and six-
fold in Global Economy. Eastern Europe’s share in total trade increases most significantly in 
Strong Europe, due to a well-functioning common internal market in the enlarged EU. The size 
of the trade flows increases by a factor of five. In Transatlantic Market, the United States 
benefits from the common internal market with the EU-15 and Latin America, and its share in 
total trade increases slightly. The magnitude of trade increases by 300% between 2000 and 
2040. That is larger than for any other region in that scenario. 
 
In 2000, almost 54% of all exports of EU-15 countries concern intra-EU trade. Slightly more 
than 18% flow to non-OECD countries (mainly in Asia), while the remaining 28% flow more or 
less equally to the US, the Rest of the OECD, and the Eastern part of Europe (Central and 
Eastern European countries, Russia and Turkey).  
The direction of trade changes drastically in most scenarios, as shown in figure 7.2. Asia 
will become a more important trading partner for Europe during the coming decades in Strong 
Europe and Global Economy, in particular. This is triggered by high economic growth in Asia, 
and explains the high export share in non-OECD countries in the other scenarios. The internal 
market deepens and widens most in Strong Europe and Regional Communities, and least in 
Transatlantic Market. The deepening of the internal market stimulates EU intra trade. For that 
reason, the EU-15 export much less to Asia in Strong Europe than in Global Economy— in 
spite of high growth in both scenarios.  
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The smallest changes in trade patterns occur in Regional Communities, where overall GDP 
growth is low and trade barriers remain largely intact. The share of exports to non-OECD 
regions increases from 18% in 2000 to more than 23% in 2040, due primarily to the relatively 
high growth rates in Asia compared to the OECD. This increase comes at the expense of trade 
to other OECD regions. The share of intra EU-15 trade hardly changes because of the 
deepening of the internal market. 
In Transatlantic Market, the trade intensity between the EU-15 and the US increases, 
thereby boosting the export share from 10% to almost 14%. Increasing Transatlantic trade also 
leads to trade diversion, which shows up in a lower share of intra-EU trade (falling to 49%) and 
a more moderate increase in the trade share with non-OECD countries (rising to 20%). 
The share of intra-EU-15 trade falls most substantially in Global Economy, where trade with 
non-OECD countries almost doubles, primarily because of the high growth in Asia, together 
with the removal of trade barriers. In both Strong Europe and Global Economy, trade with 
Central and Eastern Europe increases, due to the enlargement of the EU. In Strong Europe, the 
export share with these regions increases from 8% in 2000 to more than 10% in 2040. 
7.3  The comparative advantages of regions 
Trade liberalisation also affects the sectoral pattern of trade. In particular, table 7.3 reveals that 
the share of services in EU-15 exports increases from 20.8% in 2000 to about 28% in 2040. 
This comes at the expense of manufacturing, the share of which decreases from 70% in 2000, to 
between 59% and 62% in 2040, depending on the scenario. The reason for the fall in the export 
share of manufacturing is that other countries (such as Asian ones) specialise more in the 
production of manufacturing goods, thereby competing with manufacturing sectors in Europe.
20 
 
Table 7.3  Sectoral exports of the EU-15 (as share of total export) 






           
Agriculture and food  7.5  10.9  5.7  8.1  7.1 
Energy and raw materials  2.4  1.8  3.5  4.4  6.9 
Chemicals and minerals  14.6  14.9  15.1  14.9  17.9 
Capital goods  38.1  28.7  32.6  28.8  26.8 
Other manufacturing  16.7  16.2  15.1  15.7  14.7 
Trade and transport  10.1  11.2  16.9  13.5  12.7 
Business services  6.8  10.5  6.9   9.2   9.3 
Other services  3.8  5.8  4.1  5.5  4.9 
 
Source: WorldScan; see the appendix for the aggregation of the sectors. 
 
20Moreover, the price of services increases relative to manufacturing goods, so that the export share of services in value-
added terms increases more than that in volume terms.   58 
 
Figure 7.3 shows the so-called revealed comparative advantages of various sectors in the EU. It 
measures the exports of a particular sector in total exports relative to the average export share of 
that sector in other countries in the world (and multiplied by 100). Hence, if a sector features an 
index higher than 100, then it is said that a region specialises its exports in that sector (i.e. it has 
a comparative advantage in that sector relative to other regions). From figure 7.3, we learn that 
the EU-15 specialises today in the exports of agriculture, chemicals and minerals, capital goods 
and business services. In all scenarios, the EU-15 maintains its comparative advantage in 
chemicals and minerals and business services. It becomes less specialised in capital goods and 
in other manufacturing.  
Despite these similarities, the development in comparative advantages varies substantially 
among the scenarios. In general, the revealed comparative advantages change most in Strong 
Europe and Global Economy, where markets become more integrated. The relative export 
specialisation of Europe in agriculture deteriorates in most scenarios—except for Regional 
Communities, where it increases (since agricultural trade barriers still exist in that scenario). 
These barriers protect the position of European agriculture and food processing. In Strong 
Europe, all these barriers are eliminated, which explains the reduction in competitiveness. This 
is a bit less pronounced in Transatlantic Market and Global Economy. In the former scenario, 
the trade barriers between the EU-15 and Asia and Africa remain. Only the barriers with Latin 
America and the US cease to exist. In Global Economy, the trade barriers in agriculture are 
reduced but not eliminated.  
 The export pattern of the EU-15 becomes more specialised in Trade and Transport in all 
scenarios, excepting Regional Communities. This sector benefits from more trade, whether that 
is directed to the US, in Transatlantic Market, or to the non-OECD, as in the other scenarios.  
The comparative advantage of Business Services and Other Services decreases in 
Transatlantic Market. The reason is that the US has a comparative advantage in these sectors 
and, therefore, enters Europe in the common internal market. In the other scenarios Europe can 
also compete with other regions. Compared to these regions, it has a comparative advantage in 
services. 
The relatively strong position of energy and raw materials in Global Economy compared to the 
other scenarios is inflated by a price effect. In the former scenario energy becomes scarce, and 
prices increase. Because in Europe the extraction and production of energy and raw materials 
require less energy and raw materials than in other regions, the increase in the production price 
is moderate. As a result, European competitiveness in this sector increases.   59 
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7.4  Conclusions 
Trade policies have an important effect on the degree of openness of countries and the direction 
of trade flows. In scenarios with nearly no or only some regional trade liberalisation policies, 
the degree of openness hardly changes. Regional trade policies steer the direction of trade 
flows, as in Transatlantic Market. Trade openness increases substantially if trade is liberalised 
at a global level. Combined with high economic growth in Asia, European trade with Asia 
becomes relatively more important.  
In globalising environments, the EU-15 specialises in chemicals and services. This 
specialisation pattern is much more pronounced in these scenarios than in the Atlantic economic 
union with the US. The reason is that the US is even more specialised in services than the EU-
15 is. The EU-15 seems to benefit more from global trade liberalisation than from a regional 
arrangement with the US. On the other hand, competitiveness in capital goods and other 
manufacturing deteriorates less if trade barriers with the non-OECD remain. The scenarios also 
show that fortress Europe effectively protects agriculture and food processing. If the trade 
barriers in agriculture disappear, then Europe faces more fierce competition.   60   61 
8  Conclusions 
Before presenting the conclusions, we have to put them into perspective. The numbers 
presented are not the predictions of future economic developments, but numerical illustrations 
of the four scenarios. With that in mind, some general conclusions can be drawn. 
We have used Eurostat population scenarios in our study. These indicate that annual 
population growth will diminish in the next forty years. On average, population growth will be 
in the range of -0.2% to 0.3% per year. During the last two decades of the 20
th century the 
growth was on average 0.3% per year. The composition of the population will also change. The 
population ages: a much larger share of the population will be older than 65 years. That is the 
case in every scenario—even including substantial immigration flows. 
A first conclusion is that if age-specific participation rates do not change in the next 
decades, the macro labour-participation rate will decline by about 5% to 6%-points between 
2000 and 2040. Higher age-specific participation rates could reduce the fall in the macro 
participation rate. If labour-market participation of the population aged 20 to 65 increases from 
75% to 88%, the macro participation rate will be more or less constant in time. This increase 
stems primarily from higher labour market-participation of those aged 55 and older, and higher 
labour-market participation of women. Participation increases substantially in Transatlantic 
Market and Global Economy. Together with low unemployment, employment growth exceeds 
population growth by 0.1%-point. This seems remarkable, considering ageing. It is often 
concluded that ageing will have a negative effect on employment growth. Our scenarios show 
that if labour-market participation of the elderly can be raised substantially and unemployment 
levels can be reduced, employment growth remains on track with population growth. These 
conditions will not be met automatically. In the other scenarios, Strong Europe and Regional 
Communities, employment growth is negative, and is about 0.3%-points lower than population 
growth. This contrasts with developments in the last decades of the 20
th century, when 
employment growth surpassed population growth by 0.4%-points per year. 
A second conclusion is that GDP and GDP per capita growth will decline. On average, 
annual GDP growth in the scenario period lies between 0.6% and 2.5%. This is lower than in 
the recent past, except for Global Economy. GDP growth diminishes primarily because of 
declining employment growth. That is not the only reason, however. Labour productivity 
decreases slightly, due to a shift in the economy towards services: service sectors experience 
less productivity growth than manufacturing and agriculture. Labour productivity growth is in 
the rage of 1.1 to 2.1% per year. GDP per capita growth lies between 0.8% and 2.2% per year. 
In time, GDP per capita growth slows down, as the decrease in employment growth exceeds 
that in population growth.  
Ageing leads to a reduction in savings as a share of national income: the elderly dissave. 
Savings as a share of national income drop by 5% to 6%-points between 2000 and 2040. The 
various demographic and economic developments in the scenarios have a minor impact on the   62 
variation in savings rates. The question is how the real interest rate is affected by ageing. This is 
particularly relevant for the affordability of capital-funded pensions systems. In our scenarios 
the effect of ageing on the pattern of the real interest rate is unclear. Dissavings exert upward 
pressure on the interest rate, but lower employment growth exerts downward pressure. 
Moreover, the rate of economic growth and the degree of capital mobility is important. In 2040, 
the spread of the real interest rate over the scenarios is 1.7%-points. If economic growth is high, 
the real interest rate could rise slightly. In the scenarios featuring modest economic growth, the 
real interest rates will decrease. This suggests that the affordability of pension systems is related 
more to the rate of economic growth than to the savings rate or degree of capital mobility. The 
EU-15 becomes a net borrower on the international capital market. Capital is relatively 
abundant in Asia, due to high savings rates. After 2010, a part of the savings In Asia flows to 
the EU-15. The higher the degree of capital mobility, the larger the inflow will be. This 
depresses real interest rates in the EU-15. 
A fourth conclusion is that global trade-liberalisation policies aimed at reducing tariff and 
non-tariff barriers substantially increase the openness of countries. Together with high 
economic growth in Asia, EU openness measured as share of GDP increases from 30% to about 
45% in Strong Europe and Global Economy. Global trade liberalisation seems to benefit trade 
and transport, business services, and chemicals and minerals in the EU-15, at the expense of 
capital goods and manufacturing. European agriculture and food processing loses 
competitiveness if agricultural trade is liberalised.  63 
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Appendix 
This appendix presents more details of WorldScan. First, it presents the production structure 
with the relevant substitution elasticities. Second, it presents the Armington elasticities in the 
model, and finally, it gives an overview of the regional and sectoral structure of the model 
based on the GTAP database.  
Production technologies 
Sectoral production technologies are modelled as nested CES functions. The value of the 
substitution parameter determines the substitution possibilities between input factors. The top 
level, where the fixed factor is split off, is relevant only for the sectors agriculture, energy 
carriers and raw materials. For all manufacturing and service sectors we assume constant 
returns to scale in production. In the next level of the production tree, value-added plus energy 
carriers and material inputs are subdivided. This CES-function has a very low substitution 
elasticity (.01), creating a Leontief structure. The nesting structure of the Material inputs has a 
substitution elasticity of .60. We assume relatively high substitution elasticities between Value-
added and Energy carriers (.50). The Value-added nest has a substitution elasticity of 0.85 
between capital and labour. 
 
Sectoral production elasticities 
  All sectors   Agriculture  Energy  Other raw materials 
         
Fixed factor and rest  0.10  0.90  0.40  0.80 
Nest of intermediates and nest of 
value added/energy 
0.01  0.30  0.01  0.01 
Energy and value added  0.50  0.60  0.10  0.10 
Capital and labour  0.85  0.85  0.85  0.85 
Intermediates  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60 
 
Trade   
Trade represents the difference between regional production and consumption. With respect to 
trade, WorldScan adopts an Armington specification, explaining two-way trade between regions 
and allowing market power of each region. The demand elasticity for manufacturing industries, 
agriculture and raw materials is set at 5.6, based on the work of Hummels (1999). For services, 
the elasticity is set at a lower level: 4.0. Bilateral trade depends on consumer preferences for 
regional varieties of a good, and differences in relative prices. The latter depend among other 
things on trade barriers. These are described in chapter 3. 
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Regional concordance between WorldScan and GTAP data 
Germany   
France   
United Kingdom   
Netherlands   
BLU  Belgium-Luxembourg 
Italy   
Spain   
Rest EU  Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Austria, Portugal, Greece 
Central Europe  Poland, Hungary, Rest Central Europe 
Former Soviet Union    
Turkey   
United States   
Rest OECD  Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Iceland & Norway, Switzerland 
Latin America and Caribbean  Central America and Caribbean, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Colombia, Rest of South America 
Middle East and North Africa  Rest of Middle East, Morocco, Rest of North Africa, 
Rest World  All regions in Africa (except Morocco and Rest of North Africa), all regions in Asia 
(except Japan), and Rest of World 
 
Sectoral concordance between WorldScan and GTAP 
Agriculture  Paddy rice, Wheat, Grains, Cereal Grains, Non grain crops, Vegetables, Oil seeds, 
Sugar cane Plant-based fibres, Crops, Bovine cattle, Animal products, Raw milk, 
Wool, Forestry, Fisheries 
Energy  Refined Petrol and Coal, Gas, Coal, Electricity 
Other raw materials  Oil, Minerals 
Food processing  Processed rice, Meat products, Vegetable Oils, Dairy products, Sugar, Other food 
products, Beverages and tobacco 
Consumption goods  Textile, Wearing Apparel, Leather products, Wood products, Other manufacturing 
Printing, paper and publishing   
Chemicals and minerals  Chemicals, Rubbers and Plastics, Mineral Products 
Metals  Nonferrous Minerals, Ferrous Minerals 
Capital goods  Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment, Other Transport Industries, 
Motor Vehicles and parts, Electronic Equipment 
Transport services  Water, Air and other Transport 
Trade services   
Communication   
Construction   
Financial services  Insurance, Other financial services 
Other business services   
Other services  Gas manufacturing and distribution, Water, Recreational services, Government 
services 
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For expositional purposes, sectors are often combined into the aggregates presented in the table 
below. 
 
Sectoral aggregation of WorldScan sectors 
Four aggregated sectors  Eight aggregated sectors  All 16 sectors 
Agriculture and food  Agriculture and food  Agriculture 
    Processed food 
Energy and raw materials  Energy and raw materials  Energy 
    Other raw materials 
Manufacturing  Chemicals and minerals  Chemicals and minerals 
  Capital goods  Capital goods 
  Other manufacturing goods  Consumption goods 
    Paper, printing and publishing 
    Metals 
Services  Trade and transport  Trade services 
    Transport services 
    Communication 
  Business services  Financial services 
    Other business services 
  Other services  Construction 
    Other services 
 
 